Changing the Environment discussion

Changing the Environment discussion

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Mind and Society by Lev Vygotsky Lev Vygotsky Mind and Society Written: 1930; Source: Mind and Society. L. S. Vygotsky; Published by: Harvard University Press; Transcribed: by Andy Blunden and Nate Schmolze. Table of Contents: Editors’ Preface Introduction by Mike Cole and Sylvia Scribner Biographical Note on L.S. Vygotsky Basic Theory and Data Chapter 1 – Tool and Symbol in Child Development Chapter 2 – The development of Perception and Attention Chapter 3 – Mastery of Memory and Thinking Chapter 4 – Internalization of Higher Psychological Functions Chapter 5 – Problems of Method Educational Implication Chapter 6 – Interaction between Learning and Development http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/index.htm (1 of 2)2004/9/29 上午 11:46:38 Mind and Society by Lev Vygotsky Chapter 7 – The Role of Play in Development Chapter 8 – The Prehistory of Written Language Afterword by Vera Steiner and Ellen Souberman Notes Vygotsky’s Works Vygotsky Internet Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/index.htm (2 of 2)2004/9/29 上午 11:46:38 ZPD Mind and Society. Lev Vygotsky 1930 Interaction between Learning and Development The problems encountered in the psychological analysis of teaching cannot be correctly resolved or even formulated without addressing the relation between learning and development in school-age children. Yet it is the most unclear of all the basic issues on which the application of child development theories to educational processes depends. Needless to say, the lack of theoretical clarity does not mean that the issue is removed altogether from current research efforts into learning; not one study can avoid this central theoretical issue. But the relation between learning and development remains methodologically unclear because concrete research studies have embodied theoretically vague, critically unevaluated, and sometimes internally contradictory postulates, premises, and peculiar solutions to the problem of this fundamental relationship; and these, of course, result in a variety of errors. Essentially, all current conceptions of the relation between development and learning in children can be reduced to three major theoretical positions. The first centers on the assumption that processes of child development are independent of learning. Learning is considered a purely external process that is not actively involved in development. It merely utilizes the achievements of development rather than providing an impetus for modifying its course. In experimental investigations of the development of thinking in school children, it has been assumed that processes such as deduction and understanding, evolution of notions about the world, interpretation of physical causality, and mastery of logical forms of thought and abstract logic all occur by themselves, without any influence from school learning. An example of such a theory is Piaget’s extremely complex and interesting theoretical principles, which also shape the experimental methodology he employs. The questions Piaget uses in the course of his “clinical conversations” with children clearly illustrate his approach. When a five-year-old is asked “why doesn’t the sun fall?” it is assumed that the child has neither a ready answer for such a http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (1 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD question nor the general capabilities for generating one. The point of asking questions that are so far beyond the reach of the child’s intellectual skills is to eliminate the influence of previous experience and knowledge. The experimenter seeks to obtain the tendencies of children’s thinking in “pure” form, entirely independent of learning.’ Similarly, the classics of psychological literature, such as the works by Binet and others, assume that development is always a prerequisite for learning and that if a child’s mental functions (intellectual operations) have not matured to the extent that he is capable of learning a particular subject, then no instruction will prove useful. They especially feared premature instruction, the teaching of a subject before the child was ready for it. All effort was concentrated on finding the lower threshold of learning ability, the age at which a particular kind of learning first becomes possible. Because this approach is based on the premise that learning trails behind development, that development always outruns learning, it precludes the notion that learning may play a role in the course of the development or maturation of those functions activated in the course of learning. Development or maturation is viewed as a precondition of learning but never the result of it. To summarize this position: Learning forms a superstructure over development, leaving the latter essentially unaltered. The second major theoretical position is that learning is development. This identity is the essence of a group of theories that are quite diverse in origin. One such theory is based on the concept of reflex, an essentially old notion that has been extensively revived recently. Whether reading, writing, or arithmetic is being considered, development is viewed as the mastery of conditioned reflexes; that is, the process of learning is completely and inseparably blended with the process of development. This notion was elaborated by James, who reduced the learning process to habit formation and identified the learning process with development. Reflex theories have at least one thing in common with theories such as Piaget’s: in both, development is conceived of as the elaboration and substitution of innate http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (2 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD responses. As James expressed it, “Education, in short, cannot be better described than by calling it the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior.” Development itself is reduced primarily to the accumulation of all possible responses. Any acquired response is considered either a more complex form of or a substitute for the innate response. But despite the similarity between the first and second theoretical positions, there is a major difference in their assumptions about the temporal relationship between learning and developmental processes. Theorists who hold the first view assert that developmental cycles precede learning cycles; maturation precedes learning and instruction must lag behind mental growth. For the second group of theorists, both processes occur simultaneously; learning and development coincide at all points in the same way that two identical geometrical figures coincide when supetimposed. The third theoretical position on the relation between learning and development attempts to overcome the extremes of the other two by simply combining them. A clear example of this approach is Kofika’s theory, in which development is based on two inherently different but related processes, each of which influences the other. On the one hand is maturation, which depends directly on the development of the nervous system; on the other hand is learning, which itself is also a developmental process. Three aspects of this theory are new. First, as we already noted, is the combination of two seemingly opposite viewpoints, each of which has been encountered separately in the history of science. The very fact that these two viewpoints can be combined into one theory indicates that they are not opposing and mutually exclusive but have something essential in common. Also new is the idea that the two processes that make up development are mutually dependent and interactive. Of course, the nature of the interaction is left virtually unexplored in Koffka’s work, which is limited solely to very general remarks regarding the relation between these two processes. It is clear that for Koffka the process of maturation prepares and makes possible a specific process of learning. The learning process then stimulates and pushes forward the maturation process. The third and most important new aspect of this theory is the http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (3 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD expanded role it ascribes to learning in child development. This emphasis leads us directly to an old pedagogical problem, that of formal discipline and the problem of transfer. Pedagogical movements that have emphasized formal discipline and urged the teaching of classical languages, ancient civilizations, and mathematics have assumed that regardless of the irrelevance of these particular subjects for daily living, they were of the greatest value for the pupil’s mental development. A variety of studies have called into question the soundness of this idea. It has been shown that learning in one area has very little influence on overall development. For example, reflex theorists Woodworth and Thorndike found that adults who, after special exercises, had achieved considerable success in determining the length of short lines, had made virtually no progress in their ability to determine the length of long lines. These same adults were successfully trained to estimate the size of a given two-dimensional figure, but this training did not make them successful in estimating the size of a series of other two-dimensional figures of various sizes and shapes. According to Thorndike, theoreticians in psychology and education believe that every particular response acquisition directly enhances overall ability in equal measure.4 Teachers believed and acted on the basis of the theory that the mind is a complex of abilities—powers of observation, attention, memory, thinking, and so forth—and that any improvement in any specific ability results in a general improvement in all abilities. According to this theory, if the student increased the attention he paid to Latin grammar, he would increase his abilities to focus attention on any task. The words “accuracy,” “quick-wittedness,” “ability to reason,” “memory,” “power of observation,” “attention,” “concentration,” and so forth are said to denote actual fundamental capabilities that vary in accordance with the material with which they operate; these basic abilities are substantially modified by studying particular subjects, and they retain these modifications when they turn to other areas. Therefore, if someone learns to do any single thing well, he will also be able to do other entirely unrelated things well as a result of some secret connection. It is assumed that mental capabilities function independently of the material with which they operate, and that the development of one ability entails the development of others. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (4 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD Thorndike himself opposed this point of view. Through a variety of studies he showed that particular forms of activity, such as spelling, are dependent on the mastery of specific skills and material necessary for the performance of that particular task. The development of one particular capability seldom means the development of others. Thorndike argued that specialization of abilities is even greater than superficial observation may indicate. For example, if, out of a hundred individuals we choose ten who display the ability to detect spelling errors or to measure lengths, it is unlikely that these ten will display better abilities regarding, for example, the estimation of the weight of objects. In the same way, speed and accuracy in adding numbers are entirely unrelated to speed and accuracy in being able to think up antonyms. This research shows that the mind is not a complex network of general capabilities such as observation, attention, memory, judgment, and so forth, but a set of specific capabilities, each of which is, to some extent, independent of the others and is developed independently. Learning is more than the acquisition of the ability to think; it is the acquisition of many specialized abilities for thinking about a variety of things. Learning does not alter our overall ability to focus attention but rather develops various abilities to focus attention on a variety of things. According to this view, special training affects overall development only when its elements, material, and processes are similar across specific domains; habit governs us. This leads to the conclusion that because each activity depends on the material with which it operates, the development of consciousness is the development of a set of particular, independent capabilities or of a set of particular habits. Improvement of one function of consciousness or one aspect of its activity can affect the development of another only to the extent that there are elements common to both functions or activities. Developmental theorists such as Koffka and the Gestalt School—who hold to the third theoretical position outlined earlier—oppose Thorn- dike’s point of view. They assert that the influence of learning is never specific. From their study of structural principles, they argue that the learning process can never be reduced simply to the formation of skills but embodies an intellectual order that makes it possible to transfer http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (5 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD general principles discovered in solving one task to a variety of other tasks. From this point of view, the child, while learning a particular operation, acquires the ability to create structures of a certain type, regardless of the diverse materials with which she is working and regardless of the particular elements involved. Thus, Koffka does not conceive of learning as limited to a process of habit and skill acquisition. The relationship he posits between learning and development is not that of an identity but of a more complex relationship. According to Thorndike, learning and development coincide at all points, but for Koffka, development is always a larger set than learning. Schematically, the relationship between the two processes could be depicted by two concentric circles, the smaller symbolizing the learning process and the larger the developmental process evoked by learning. Once a child has learned to perform an operation, he thus assimilates some structural principle whose sphere of application is other than just the operations of the type on whose basis the principle was assimilated, Consequently, in making one step in learning, a child makes two steps in development, that is, learning and development do not coincide. This concept is the essential aspect of the third group of theories we have discussed. Zone of Proximal Development: A New Approach Although we reject all three theoretical positions discussed above, analyzing them leads us to a more adequate view of the relation between learning and development. The question to be framed in arriving at a solution to this problem is complex. It consists of two separate issues: first, the general relation between learning and development; and second, the specific features of this relationship when children reach school age. That children’s learning begins long before they attend school is the starting point of this discussion. Any learning a child encounters in school always has a previous history. For example, children begin to study arithmetic in school, but long http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (6 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD beforehand they have had some experience with quantity – they have had to deal with operations of division, addition, subtraction, and determination of size. Consequently, children have their own preschool arithmetic, which only myopic psychologists could ignore. It goes without saying that learning as it occurs in the preschool years differs markedly from school learning, which is concerned with the assimilation of the fundamentals of scientific knowledge. But even when, in the period of her first questions, a child assimilates the names of objects in her environment, she is learning. Indeed, can it be doubted that children learn speech from adults; or that, through asking questions and giving answers, children acquire a variety of information; or that, through imitating adults and through being instructed about how to act, children develop an entire repository of skills? Learning and development are interrelated from the child’s very first day of life. Koffka, attempting to clarify the laws of child learning and their relation to mental development, concentrates his attention on the simplest learning processes, those that occur in the preschool years. His error is that, while seeing a similarity between preschool and school learning, he fails to discern the difference – he does not see the specifically new elements that school learning introduces. He and others assume that the difference between preschool and school learning consists of nonsystematic learning in one case and systematic learning in the other. But “systematicness” is not the only issue; there is also the fact that school learning introduces something fundamentally new into the child’s development. 1n order to elaborate the dimensions of school learning, we will describe a new and exceptionally important concept without which the issue cannot be resolved: the zone of proximal development. A well known and empirically established fact is that learning should be matched in some manner with the child’s developmental level. For example, it has been established that the teaching of reading, writing, and arithmetic should be initiated at a specific age level. Only recently, however, has attention been directed to the fact that we cannot limit ourselves merely to determining developmental levels if we wish to discover the actual relations of the developmental process to learning capabilities. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (7 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD We must determine at least two developmental levels. The first level can be called the actual developmental level, that is, the level of development of a child’s mental functions that has been established as a result of certain already completed developmental cycles. When we determine a child’s mental age by using tests, we are almost always dealing with the actual developmental level. In studies of children’s mental development it is generally assumed that only those things that children can do on their own are indicative of mental abilities. We give children a battery of tests or a variety of tasks of varying degrees of difficulty, and we judge the extent of their mental development on the basis of how they solve them and at what level of difficulty. On the other hand, if we offer leading questions or show how the problem is to be solved and the child then solves it, or if the teacher initiates the solution and the child completes it or solves it in collaboration with other childrenin short, if the child barely misses an independent solution of the problem – the solution is not regarded as indicative of his mental development. This truth was familiar and reinforced by common sense. Over a decade even the profoundest thinkers never questioned the assumption; they never entertained the notion that what children can do with the assistance of others might be in some sense even more indicative of their mental development than what they can do alone. Let us take a simple example. Suppose I investigate two children upon entrance into school, both of whom are ten years old chronologically and eight years old in terms of mental development. Can I say that they are the same age mentally? Of course. What does this mean? It means that they can independently deal with tasks up to the degree of difficulty that has been standardized for the eight-year-old level. If I stop at this point, people would imagine that the subsequent course of mental development and of school learning for these children will be the same, because it depends on their intellect. Of course, there may be other factors, for example, if one child was sick for half a year while the other was never absent from school; but generally speaking, the fate of these children should be the same. Now imagine that I do not terminate my study at this point, but only begin it. These children seem to be capable of handling problems up to an eight-year-old’s level, but not beyond that. Suppose that I show http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (8 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD them various ways of dealing with the problem. Different experimenters might employ different modes of demonstration in different cases: some might run through an entire demonstration and ask the children to repeat it, others might initiate the solution and ask the child to finish it, or offer leading questions. In short, in some way or another I propose that the children solve the problem with my assistance. Under these circumstances it turns out that the first child can deal with problems up to a twelve-year-old’s level, the second up to a nine-year-old’s. Now, are these children mentally the same? When it was first shown that the capability of children with equal levels of mental development to learn under a teacher’s guidance varied to a high degree, it became apparent that those children were not mentally the same age and that the subsequent course of their learning would obviously be different. This difference between twelve and eight, or between nine and eight, is what we call the zone of proximal development. It is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers. If we naively ask what the actual developmental level is, or, to put it more simply, what more independent problem solving reveals, the most common answer would be that a child’s actual developmental level defines functions that have already matured, that is, the end products of development. If a child can do such-and-such independently, it means that the functions for such-and-such have matured in her. What, then, is defined by the zone of proximal development, as determined through problems that children cannot solve independently but only with assistance? The zone of proximal development defines those functions that have not yet matured but are in the process of maturation, functions that will mature tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state. These functions could be termed the buds or flowers of development rather than the “fruits” of development. The actual developmental level characterizes mental development retrospectively, while the zone of proximal development characterizes mental development prospectively. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (9 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD The zone of proximal development furnishes psychologists and educators with a tool through which the internal course of development can be understood. By using this method we can take account of not only the cycles and maturation processes that have already been completed but also those processes that are currently in a state of formation, that are just beginning to mature and develop. Thus, the zone of proximal development permits us to delineate the child’s immediate future and his dynamic developmental state, allowing not only for what already has been achieved developmentally but also for what is in the course of maturing. The two children in our example displayed the same mental age from the viewpoint of developmental cycles already completed, but the developmental dynamics of the two were entirely different. The state of a child’s mental development can be determined only by clarifying its two levels: the actual developmental level and the zone of proximal development. I will discuss one study of preschool children to demonstrate that what is in the zone of proximal development today will be the actual developmental level tomorrow that is, what a child can do with assistance today she will be able to do by herself tomorrow. The American researcher Dorothea McCarthy showed that among children between the ages of three and five there are two groups of functions: those the children already possess, and those they can perform under guidance, in groups, and in collaboration with one another but which they have not mastered independently. McCarthy’s study demonstrated that this second group of functions is at the actual developmental level of five-to-seven-year-olds. What her subjects could do only under guidance, in collaboration, and in groups at the age of three-to-five years they could do independently when they reached the age of five-to-seven years. Thus, if we were to determine only mental age – that is only functions that have matured-we would have but a summary of completed development, while if we determine the maturing functions, we can predict what will happen to these children between five and seven, provided the same developmental conditions are maintained. The zone of proximal development can become a powerful concept in developmental research, one that can markedly enhance the effectiveness and utility of the application of diagnostics of http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (10 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD mental development to educational problems. A full understanding of the concept of the zone of proximal development must result in reevaluation of the role of imitation in learning. An unshakable tenet of classical psychology is that only the independent activity of children, not their imitative activity, indicates their level of mental development. This view is expressed in all current testing systems. In evaluating mental development, consideration is given to only those solutions to test problems which the child reaches without the assistance of others, without demonstrations, and without leading questions. Imitation and learning are thought of as purely mechanical processes. But recently psychologists have shown that a person can imitate only that which is within her developmental level. For example, if a child is having difficulty with a problem in arithmetic and the teacher solves it on the blackboard, the child may grasp the solution in an instant. But if the teacher were to solve a problem in higher mathematics, the child would not be able to understand the solution no matter how many times she imitated it. Animal psychologists, and in particular Kohler, have dealt with this question of imitation quite well. Kohler’s experiments sought to determine whether primates are capable of graphic thought. The principal question was whether primates solved problems independently or whether they merely imitated solutions they had seen performed earlier, for example, watching other animals or humans use sticks and other tools and then imitating them. Kohler’s special experiments, designed to determine what primates could imitate, reveal that primates can use imitation to solve only those problems that are of the same degree of difficulty as those they can solve alone. However, Kohler failed to take account of an important fact, namely, that primates cannot be taught (in the human sense of the word) through imitation, nor can their intellect be developed, because they have no zone of proximal development. A primate can learn a great deal through training by using its mechanical and mental skills, but it cannot be made more intelligent, that is, it cannot be taught to solve a variety of more advanced problems independently. For this reason animals are incapable of learning in the human sense of the term; human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (11 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD of those around them. Children can imitate a variety of actions that go well beyond the limits of their own capabilities. Using imitation, children are capable of doing much more in collective activity or under the guidance of adults. This fact, which seems to be of little significance in itself, is of fundamental importance in that it demands a radical alteration of the entire doctrine concerning the relation between learning and development in children. One direct consequence is a change in conclusions that may be drawn from diagnostic tests of development. Formerly, it was believed that by using tests, we determine the mental development level with which education should reckon and whose limits it should not exceed. This procedure oriented learning toward yesterday’s development, toward developmental stages already completed. The error of this view was discovered earlier in practice than in theory. It is demonstrated most clearly in the teaching of mentally retarded children. Studies have established that mentally retarded children are not very capable of abstract thinking. From this the pedagogy of the special school drew the seemingly correct conclusion that all teaching of such children should be based on the use of concrete, look-and-do methods. And yet a considerable amount of experience with this method resulted in profound disillusionment. It turned out that a teaching system based solely on concreteness – one that eliminated from teaching everything associated with abstract thinking – not only failed to help retarded children overcome their innate handicaps but also reinforced their handicaps by accustoming children exclusively to concrete thinking and thus suppressing the rudiments of any abstract thought that such children still have. Precisely because retarded children, when left to themselves, will never achieve well-elaborated forms of abstract thought, the school should make every effort to push them in that direction and to develop in them what is intrinsically lacking in their own development. In the current practices of special schools for retarded children, we can observe a beneficial shift away from this concept of concreteness, one that restores look-and-do methods to their proper role. Concreteness is now seen as necessary and unavoidable only as a stepping stone for developing abstract thinking-as a means, not as an end in itself. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (12 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD Similarly, in normal children, learning which is oriented toward developmental levels that have already been reached is ineffective from the viewpoint of a child’s overall development. It does not aim for a new stage of the developmental process but rather lags behind this process. Thus, the notion of a zone of proximal development enables us to propound a new formula, namely that the only “good learning’ is that which is in advance of development. The acquisition of language can provide a paradigm for the entire problem of the relation between learning and development. Language arises initially as a means of communication between the child and the people in his environment. Only subsequently, upon conversion to internal speech, does it come to organize the child’s thought, that is, become an internal mental function. Piaget and others have shown that reasoning occurs in a childrenÕs group as an argument intended to prove one’s own point of view before it occurs as an internal activity whose distinctive feature is that the child begins to perceive and check the basis of his thoughts. Such observations prompted Piaget to conclude that communication produces the need for checking and confirming thoughts, a process that is characteristic of adult tbought. In the same way that internal speech and reflective thought arise from the interactions between the child and persons in her environment, these interactions provide the source of development of a child’s voluntary behavior. Piaget has shown that cooperation provides the basis for the development of a child’s moral judgment. Earlier research established that a child first becomes able to subordinate her behavior to rules in group play and only later does voluntary self-regulation of behavior arise as an internal function. These individual examples illustrate a general developmental law for the higher mental functions that we feel can be applied in its entirety to children’s learning processes. We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with his peers. Once these processes are internalized, they become part of the child’s independent developmental http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (13 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD achievement. From this point of view, learning is not development; however, properly organized learning results in mental development and sets in motion a variety of developmental processes that would be impossible apart from learning. Thus, learning is a necessary and universal aspect of the process of developing culturally organized, specifically human, psychological functions. To summarize, the most essential feature of our hypothesis is the notion that developmental processes do not coincide with learning processes. Rather, the developmental process lags behind the learning process; this sequence then results in zones of proximal development. Our analysis alters the traditional view that at the moment a child assimilates the meaning of a word, or masters an operation such as addition or written language, her developmental processes are basically completed. In fact, they have only just begun at that moment. The major consequence of analyzing the educational process in this manner is to show that the initial mastery of, for example, the four arithmetic operations provides the basis for the subsequent development of a variety of highly complex internal processes in children’s thinking. Our hypothesis establishes the unity but not the identity of learning processes and internal developmental processes. It presupposes that the one is converted into the other. Therefore, it becomes an important concern of psychological research to show how external knowledge and abilities in children become internalized. Any investigation explores some sphere of reality. An aim of the psychological analysis of development is to describe the internal relations of the intellectual processes awakened by school learning. In this respect, such analysis will be directed inward and is analogous to the use of x-rays. If successful, it should reveal to the teacher how developmental processes stimulated by the course of school learning are carried through inside the head of each individual child. The revelation of this internal, subterranean developmental network of school subjects is a task of primary importance for psychological and educational analysis. A second essential feature of our hypothesis is the notion that, although learning is http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (14 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 ZPD directly related to the course of child development, the two are never accomplished in equal measure or in parallel. Development in children never follows school learning the way a shadow follows the object that casts it. In actuality, there are highly complex dynamic relations between developmental and learning processes that cannot be encompassed by an unchanging hypothetical formulation. Each school subject has its own specific relation to the course of child development, a relation that varies as the child goes from one stage to another. This leads us directly to a reexamination of the problem of formal discipline, that is, to the significance of each particular subject from the viewpoint of overall mental development. Clearly, the problem cannot be solved by using any one formula; extensive and highly diverse concrete research based on the concept of the zone of proximal development is necessary to resolve the issue. Table of Contents Psychology and Marxism | Lev Vygotsky http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/chap6.htm (15 of 15)2004/9/29 上午 11:50:48 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky Mind and Society. Lev Vygotsky 1930 The Prehistory of Written Language Until now, writing has occupied too narrow a place in school practice as compared to the enormous role that it plays in children’s cultural development. The teaching of writing has been conceived in narrowly practical terms. Children are taught to trace out letters and make words out of them, but they are not taught written language. The mechanics of reading what is written are so emphasized that they overshadow written language as such. Something similar has happened in teaching spoken language to deaf-mutes. Attention has been concentrated entirely on correct production of particular letters and distinct articulation of them. In this case, teachers of deaf-mutes have not discerned spoken language behind these pronunciation techniques, and the result has been dead speech. This situation is to be explained primarily, by historical factors: specifically, by the fact that practical pedagogy, despite the existence of many methods for teaching reading and writing, has yet to work out an effective, scientific procedure for teaching children written language. Unlike the teaching of spoken language, into which children grow of their own accord, teaching of written language is based on artificial training. Such training requires an enormous amount of attention and effort on the part of teacher and pupil and thus becomes something self-contained, relegating living written language to the background. Instead of being founded on the needs of children as they naturally develop and on their own activity, writing is given to them from without, from the teacher’s hands. This situation recalls the development of a technical skill such as piano-playing: the pupil develops finger dexterity and learns to strike the keys while reading music, but he is in no way involved in the essence of the music itself. Such one-sided enthusiasm for the mechanics of writing has had an impact not only http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (1 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky on the practice of teaching but on the theoretical statement of the problem as well. Up to this point, psychology has conceived of writing as a complicated motor skill. It has paid remarkably little attention to the question of written language as such, that is, a particular system of symbols and signs whose mastery heralds a critical turning-point in the entire cultural development of the child. A feature of this system is that it is second-order symbolism, which gradually becomes direct symbolism. This means that written language consists of a system of signs that designate the sounds and words of spoken language, which, in turn, are signs for real entities and relations. Gradually this intermediate link, spoken language, disappears, and written language is converted into a system of signs that directly symbolize the entities and relations between them. It seems clear that mastery of such a complex sign system cannot be accomplished in a purely mechanical and external manner; rather it is the culmination of a long process of development of complex behavioral functions in the .child. Only by understanding the entire history of sign development in the child and the place of writing in it can we approach a correct solution of the psychology of writing. The developmental history of written language, however, poses enormous difficulties for research. As far as we can judge from the available material, it does not follow a single direct line in which something like a clear continuity of forms is maintained. Instead, it offers the most unexpected metamorphoses, that is, transformations of particular forms of written language into others. To quote Baldwin’s apt expression regarding the development of things, it is as much involution as evolution.’ ‘this means that, together with processes of development, forward motion, and appearance of new forms, we can discern processes of curtailment, disappearance, and reverse development of old forms at each step. The developmental history of written language among children is full of such discontinuities. Its line of development seems to disappear altogether; then suddenly, as if from nowhere, a new line begins, and at first it seems that there is absolutely no continuity between the old and the new. But only a naive view of development as a purely evolutionary process involving nothing but the gradual accumulation of small changes and the gradual conversion of one http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (2 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky form into another can conceal from us the true nature of these processes. This revolutionary type of development is in no way new for science in general; it is new only for child psychology. Therefore, despite a few daring attempts, child psychology does not have a cogent view of the development of written language as a historical process, as a unified process of development. The first task of a scientific investigation is to reveal this prehistory of children’s written language, to show what leads children to writing, through what important points this pre-historical development passes, and in what relationship it stands to school learning. At the present time, in spite of a variety of research studies, we are in no position to write a coherent or complete history of written language in children. We can only discern the most important points in this development and discuss its major changes. This history begins with the appearance of the gesture as a visual sign for the child. Gestures and Visual Signs The gesture is the initial visual sign that contains the child’s future writing as an acorn contains a future oak. Gestures, it has been correctly said, are writing in air, and written signs frequently are simply gestures that have been fixed. Wurth pointed out the link between gesture and pictorial or pictographic writing in discussing the development of writing in human history.[2] He showed that figurative gestures often simply denote the reproduction of a graphic sign; on the other hand, signs are often the fixation of gestures. An indicating line employed in pictographic writing denotes the index finger in fixed position. All these symbolic designations in pictorial writing, according to Wurth, can be explained only by derivation from gesture language, even if they subsequently become detached from it and can function independently. There are two other domains in which gestures are linked to the origin of written signs. The first concerns children’s scribbles. We have observed in experiments on http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (3 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky drawing that children frequently switch to dramatization, depicting by gestures what they should show on the drawing; the pencil-marks are only a supplement to this gestural representation. I could cite many instances. A child who has to depict running begins by depicting the motion with her fingers, and she regards the resultant marks and dots on paper as a representation of running. When she goes on to depict jumping, her hand begins to make movements depicting jumps; what appears on paper remains the same. In general, we are inclined to view children’s first drawings and scribbles rather as gestures than as drawing in the true sense of the word. We are also inclined to ascribe to the same phenomenon the experimentally demonstrated fact that, in drawing complex objects, children do not render their parts but rather general qualities, such as an impression of roundness and so forth. When a child depicts a cylindrical can as a closed curve that resembles a circle, she thus depicts something round. This developmental phase coincides nicely with the general motor set that characterizes children of this age and governs the entire style and nature of their first drawings. Children behave in the same way in depicting concepts that are at all complex or abstract. Children do not draw, they indicate, and the pencil merely fixes the indicatory gesture. When asked to draw good weather, a child will indicate the bottom of the page by making a horizontal motion of the hand, explaining, “This is the earth,” and then, after a number of confused upward hatchwise motions, ‘And this is good weather.” We have had the occasion to verify more precisely, in experiments, the kinship between gestural depiction and depiction by drawing, and have obtained symbolic and graphic depiction through gestures in five-year-olds. Development of Symbolism in Play The second realm that links gestures and written language is children’s games. For children some objects can readily denote others, replacing them and becoming signs for them, and the degree of similarity between a plaything and the object it denotes is unimportant. What is most important is the utilization of the plaything and the possibility of executing a representational gesture with it. This is the key to the entire symbolic function of children’s play. A pile of clothes or piece of wood becomes a baby in a game because the same gestures that depict holding a baby in one’s hands or feeding a baby can apply to them.. The child’s self-motion, his own gestures, are http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (4 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky what assign the function of sign to the object and give it meaning. All symbolic representational activity is full of such indicatory gestures; for instance, a stick becomes a riding-horse for a child because it can be placed between the legs and a gesture can be employed that communicates that the stick designates a horse in this instance. From this point of view, therefore, children’s symbolic play can be understood as a very complex system of “speech” through gestures that communicate and indicate the meaning of playthings. It is only on the basis of these indicatory gestures that playthings themselves gradually acquire their meaning — just as drawing, while initially supported by gesture, becomes an independent sign. We attempted experimentally to establish this particular special stage of object writing in children. We conducted play experiments in which, in a joking manner, we began to designate things and people involved in the play by familiar objects. For example, a book off to one side designated a house, keys meant children, a pencil meant a nursemaid, a pocket watch a drugstore, a knife a doctor, an inkwell cover a horse-drawn carriage, and so forth. Then the children were given a simple story through figurative gestures involving these objects. They could read it with great case. For example, a doctor arrives at a house in a carriage, knocks at the door, the nursemaid opens, he examines the children, he writes a prescription and leaves, the nursemaid goes to the drugstore, comes back, and administers medicine to the children. Most three-year-olds can read this symbolic notation with great case. Four-or-fiveyear-olds can read more complex notation: a man is walking in the forest and is attacked by a wolf, which bites him; the man extricates himself by running, a doctor gives him aid, and he goes to the drugstore and then home; a hunter sets out for the forest to kill the wolf. What is noteworthy is that perceptual similarity of objects plays no noticeable part in the understanding of the symbolic notation. All that matters is that the objects admit the appropriate gesture and can function as a point of application for it. Hence, things http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (5 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky with which this gestural structure cannot be performed are absolutely rejected by children. For example, in this game, which is conducted at a table and which involves small items on the table, children will absolutely refuse to_ play if we take their fingers, put them on a book, and say, “Now, as a joke, these will be children.” They object that there is no such game. Fingers are too connected with their own bodies for them to be an object for a corresponding indicatory gesture. In the same way, a piece of furniture in the room or one of the people in the game cannot become involved. The object itself performs a substitution function: a pencil substitutes for a nursemaid or a watch for a drugstore, but only the relevant gesture endows them with this meaning. However, under the influence of this gesture, older children begin to make one exceptionally important discovery — that objects can indicate the things they denote as well as substitute for them. For example, when we put down a book with a dark cover and say that this will be a forest, a child will spontaneously add, “Yes, ifs a forest because it’s black and dark.” She thus isolates one of the features of the object, which for her is an indication of the fact that the book is supposed to mean a forest. In the same way, when a metal inkwell cover denotes a carriage, a child will point and say, “This is the seat.” When a pocket watch is to denote a drugstore, one child might point to the numbers on the face and say, “This is medicine in the drugstore”; another might point to the ring and say, “This is the entrance.” Referring to a bottle that is playing the part of a wolf, a child will point to the neck and say, “And this is his mouth.” If the experimenter asks, pointing to the stopper, “And what is this?” the child answers, “He’s caught the stopper and is holding it in his teeth.” In all these examples we see the same thing, namely, that the customary structure of thin gs is modified under the impact of the new meaning it has acquired. In response to the fact that a watch denotes a drugstore, a feature of the watch is isolated and assumes the function of a new sign or indication of how the watch denotes a drugstore, either through the feature of medicine or of the entrance. The customary structure of things (stopper in a bottle) begins to be reflected in the new structure (wolf holds stopper in teeth), and this structural modification becomes so strong that in a number of experiments we sometimes instilled a particular symbolic meaning of an object in the children. For example, a pocket watch denoted a drugstore in all our http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (6 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky play sessions. whereas other objects changed meaning rapidly and frequently. In taking up a new game, we would put down the same watch and explain, in accordance with the new procedures, “Now this — is a bakery.” One child immediately placed a pen edgewise across the watch, dividing it in half, and, indicating one half, said, “All right, here is the drugstore, and here is the bakery.” The old meaning thus became independent and functioned as a means for a new one. We could also discern this acquisition of independent meaning outside the immediate game; if a knife fell, a child would exclaim, “The doctor has fallen.” Thus, the object acquires a sign function with a developmental history of its own that is now independent of the child’s gesture. This is second-order symbolism, and because it develops in play, we see make-believe play as a major contributor to the development of written language — a system of second-order symbolism. As in play, so too in drawing, representation of meaning initially arises as first-order symbolism. As we have already pointed out the first drawings arise from gestures of the (pencil-equipped) hand, and the gesture constitutes the first representation of meaning. Only later on does the graphic representation begin independently to denote some object. The nature of this relationship is that the marks already made on paper are given an appropriate name. H. Hetzer undertook to study experimentally how symbolic representation of things — so important in learning to write — develops in three-to-six-year-old children.[3] Her experiments involved four basic series. The first investigated the function of symbols in children’s play. Children were to portray, in play, a father or mother doing what they do in the course of a day. During this game a make-believe interpretation of particular objects was given, making it possible for the researcher to trace the symbolic function assigned to things during the game. The second series involved building materials, and the third involved drawing with colored pencils. Particular attention in both these experiments was paid to the point at which the appropriate meaning was named. The fourth series undertook to investigate, in the form of a game of post office, the extent to which children can perceive purely arbitrary combinations of signs. The game used pieces of paper of various colors to denote http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (7 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky different types of mail: telegrams, newspapers, money orders, packages, letters, postcards, and so forth. Thus, the experiments explicitly related these different forms of activity, whose only common feature is that a symbolic function is involved in all of them, and attempted to link them all with the development of written language, as we did in our experiments. Hetzer was able to show clearly which symbolic meanings arise in play via figurative gestures and which via words. Children’s egocentric language was widely manifest in these games. Whereas some children depicted everything by using movements and mimicry, not employing speech as a symbolic resource at all, for other children actions were accompanied by speech: the child both spoke and acted. For a third group, purely verbal expression not supported by any activity began to predominate. Finally, a fourth group of children did not play at all, and speech became the sole mode of representation, with mimicry and gestures receding into the background. The percentage of purely play actions decreased with age, while speech gradually predominated. The most important conclusion drawn from this developmental investigation, as the author says, is that the difference in play activity between threeyear-olds and six-year-olds is not in the perception of symbols but in the mode in which various forms of representation are used. In our opinion, this is a highly important conclusion; it indicates that symbolic representation in play is essentially a particular form of speech at an earlier stage, one which leads directly to written language. As development proceeds, the general process of naming shifts farther and farther toward the beginning of the process, and thus the process itself is tantamount to the writing of a word that has just been named. Even a three-year-old understands the representational function of a toy construction, while a four-year-old names his creations even before he begins to construct them. Similarly, we see in drawing that a three-year-old is still unaware of the symbolic meaning of a drawing; it is only around age seven that all children master this completely. At the same time, our analysis of children’s drawings definitely shows that, from the psychological point of view, we should regard such drawings as a particular kind of child speech. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (8 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky Development of Symbolism in Drawing K. Buhler correctly notes that drawing begins in children when spoken speech has already made great progress and has become habitual .4 Subsequently, he says, speech predominates in general and shapes the greater part of inner life in accordance with its laws. This includes drawing. Children initially draw from memory. If asked to draw their mother sitting opposite them or some object before them, they draw without ever looking at the original — not what they see but what they know. Often children’s drawings not only disregard but also directly contradict the actual perception of the object. We find what Buhler calls “x-ray drawings.” A child will draw a clothed figure, but at the same time will include his legs, stomach, wallet in his pocket, and even the money m the wallet — that is, things he knows about but which cannot be seen in the case in question. In drawing a figure in profile, a child will add a second eye or will include a second leg on a horseman in profile. Finally, very important parts of the object will be omitted; for instance, a child will draw legs that grow straight out of the head, omitting the neck and torso, or will combine individual parts of a figure.[4] As Sully showed, children do not strive for representation; they are much more symbolists than naturalists and are in no way concerned with complete and exact similarity, desiring only the most superficial indications.[5] We cannot assume that children know people no better than they depict them; rather they try more to name and designate than to represent. A child’s memory does not yield a simple depiction of representational images at this age. Rather, it yields predispositions to judgments that are invested with speech or capable of being so invested. We see that when a child unburdens his repository of memory in drawing, he does so in the mode of speech — telling a story. A major feature of this mode is a certain degree of abstraction, which any verbal representation necessarily entails. Thus we see that drawing is graphic speech that arises on the basis of verbal speech. The schemes that distinguish children’s first drawings are reminiscent in this sense of verbal concepts that communicate only the essential features of objects. This gives us grounds for http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (9 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky regarding children’s drawing as a preliminary stage in the development of written language. The further development of children’s drawing, however, is not something selfunderstood and purely mechanical. There is a critical moment in going from simple mark-making on paper to the use of pencil-marks as signs that depict or mean something. All psychologists agree that the child must discover that the lines he makes can signify something. Sully illustrates this discovery using the example of a child who haphazardly drew a spiral line, without any meaning, suddenly grasped a certain similarity, and joyfully exclaimed, “Smoke, smoke!” Although this process of recognizing what is drawn is encountered in early childhood, it is still not equivalent to the discovery of symbolic function, as observations have shown. Initially, even if a child perceives a similarity in a drawing, he takes the drawing to be an object that is similar or of the same kind, not as a representation or symbol of the object. When a girl who was shown a drawing of her doll exclaimed, “A doll just like mine!” it is possible that she had in mind another object just like hers. According to Hetzer, there is no evidence that forces us to assume that assimilation of the drawing to an object means at the same time an understanding that the drawing is a representation of the object. For the girl, the drawing is not a representation of a doll but another doll just like hers. Proof of this is provided by the fact that for a long time children relate to drawings as if they were objects. For example, when a drawing shows a boy with his back to the observer, the child will turn the sheet over to try to see the face. Even among five-year-olds we always observed that, in response to the question, “Where is his face and nose?’ children would turn the drawing over, and only then would answer, “It’s not there, it’s not drawn.” We feel that Hetzer is most justified in asserting that primary symbolic representation should be ascribed to speech, and that, it is on the basis of speech that all the other sign systems are created. Indeed, the continuing shift toward the beginning in the moment of naming a drawing is also evidence of the strong impact of speech on the development of children’s drawing. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (10 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky We have had the opportunity of observing experimentally how children’s drawing becomes real written language by giving them the task of symbolically depicting some more or less complex phrase. What was most clear in these experiments was a tendency on the part of school-age children to change from purely pictographic to ideographic writing, that is, to represent individual relations and meaning by abstract symbolic signs. We observed this dominance of speech over writing in one school child who wrote each word of the phrase in question as a separate drawing. For example, the phrase “I do not see the sheep, but they are there” was recorded as follows: a figure of a person (“I”), the same figure with its eyes covered (“don’t see”), two sheep (“the sheep”), an index finger and several trees behind which the sheep can be seen (“but they are there”). The phrase “I respect you was rendered as follows: a head (“I”), two human figures, one of which has his hat in hand (“respect”) and another head (“you”). Thus, we see how the drawing obediently follows the phrase and how spoken language intrudes into children’s drawings. In this process, the children frequently had to make genuine discoveries in inventing an appropriate mode of representation, and we were able to see that this is decisive in the development of writing and drawing in children. Symbolism in Writing In connection with our general research, Luria undertook to create this moment of discovery of the symbolics of writing so as to be able to study it systernatically.[6] In his experiments children who were as yet unable to write were confronted with the task of making some simple form of notation. The children were told to remember a certain number of phrases that greatly exceeded their natural memory capacity. When each child became convinced that he would not be able to remember them all, he was given a sheet of paper and asked to mark down or record the words presented in some fashion. Frequently, the children were bewildered by this suggestion, saying that they could http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (11 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky not write, but the experimenter furnished the child with a certain procedure and examined the extent to which the child was able to master it and extent to which the pencil-marks ceased to be simple playthings and became symbols for recalling the appropriate phrases. In the three-to-four-year-old stage, the child’s notations are of no assistance in remembering the phrases; in recalling them, the child does not look at the paper. But we occasionally encountered some seemingly astonishing cases that were sharply at variance with this general observation. In these cases, the child also makes meaningless and undifferentiated squiggles and lines, but when he reproduces phrases it seems as though he is reading them; he refers to certain specific marks and can repeatedly indicate, without error, which marks denote which phrase. An entirely new relationship to these marks and a self-reinforcing motor activity arise: for the first time the marks become mnemotechnic symbols. For example, the children place individual marks on different parts of the page in such a way as to associate a certain phrase with each mark. A characteristic kind of topography arises — one mark in one corner means a cow, while another farther up means a chimneysweep. Thus the marks are primitive indicatory signs for memory purposes. We are fully justified in seeing the first precursor of future writing in this mnemotechnic stage. Children gradually transform these undifferentiated marks. Indicatory signs and symbolizing marks and scribbles are replaced by little figures and pictures, and these in turn give way to signs. Experiments have made it possible not only to describe the very moment of discovery itself but also to follow how the process occurs as a function of certain factors. For example, the content and forms introduced into the phrases in question first break down the meaningless nature of the notation. If we introduce quantity into the material, we can readily evoke a notation that reflects this quantity, even in four-and five-year-olds. (It was the need for recording quantity, perhaps, that historically first gave rise to writing.) In the same way, the introduction of color and form are conducive to the child’s discovery of the principle of writing, For example, phrases such as “like black,” “black smoke from a chimney,” “there is white snow in winter,” “a mouse with a long tail,” or “Lyalya has two eyes and one nose” rapidly cause the child to change over from writing that functions as indicatory gesture to writing that contains the rudiments of representation. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (12 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky It is easy to see that the written signs are entirely first-order symbols at this point, directly denoting objects or actions, and the child has yet to reach second-order symbolism, which involves the creation of written signs for the spoken symbols of words. For this the child must make a basic discovery — namely that one can draw not only things but also speech. It was only this discovery that led humanity to the brilliant method of writing by words and letters; the same thing leads children to letter writing. From the pedagogical point of view, this transition should be arranged by shifting the child’s activity from drawing things to drawing speech. It is difficult to specify how this shift takes place, since the appropriate research has yet to lead to definite conclusions, and the generally accepted methods of teaching writing do not permit the observation of it. One thing only is certain — that the written language of children develops in this fashion, shifting from drawings of things to drawing of words. Various methods of teaching writing perform this in various ways. Many of them employ auxiliary gestures as a means of uniting the written and spoken symbol; others employ drawings that depict the appropriate objects. The entire secret of teaching written language is to prepare and organize this natural transition appropriately. As soon as it is achieved, the child has mastered the principle of written language and then it remains only to perfect this method. Given the current state of psychological knowledge, our notion that make-believe play, drawing, and writing can be viewed as different moments in an essentially unified process of development of written language will appear to be very much overstated. The discontinuities and jumps from one mode of activity to another are too great for the relationship to seem evident. But experiments and psychological analysis lead us to this very conclusion. They show that, however complex the process of development of written language may seem, or however erratic, disjointed, and confused it may appear superficially, there is in fact a unified historical line that leads to the highest forms of written language. This higher form, which we will mention only in passing, involves the reversion of written language from secondorder symbolism to first-order symbolism. As second-order symbols, written symbols function as designations for verbal ones. Understanding of written language is first effected through spoken language, but gradually this path is curtailed and spoken http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (13 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky language disappears as the intermediate link. To judge from all the available evidence, written language becomes direct symbolism that is perceived in the same way as spoken language. We need only try to imagine the enormous changes in the cultural development of children that occur as a result of mastery of written language and the ability to read — and of thus becoming aware of everything that human genius has created in the realm of the written word. Practical Implications An overview of the entire developmental history of written language in children leads us naturally to three exceptionally important practical conclusions. The first is that, from our point of view, it would be natural to transfer the teaching of writing to the preschool years. Indeed, if younger children are capable of discovering the symbolic function of writing, as Hetzer’s experiments have shown, then the teaching of writing should be made the responsibility of preschool education. Indeed, we see a variety of circumstances which indicate that in the Soviet Union the teaching of writing clearly comes too late from the psychological point of view. At the same time, we know that the teaching of reading and writing generally begins at age six in most European and American countries. Hetzer’s research indicates that eighty percent of three-year-olds can master an arbitrary combination of sign and meaning, while almost all six-year-olds are capable of this operation. On the basis of her observations, one may conclude that development between three and six involves not so much mastery of arbitrary signs as it involves progress in attention and memory. Therefore, Hetzer favors beginning to teach reading at earlier ages. To be sure, she disregards the fact that writing is secondorder symbolism, whereas what she studied was first-order symbolism. Burt reports that although compulsory schooling begins at age five in England, children between three and five are allowed into school if there is room and are taught the alphabet.[7] The great majority of children can read at four-and-a-half. Montessori http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (14 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky is particularly in favor of teaching reading and writing at an earlier age.[8] In the course of game situations, generally through preparatory exercises, all the children in her kindergartens in Italy begin to write at four and can read as well as first-graders at age five. But Montessori’s example best shows that the situation is much more complex than it may appear at first glance. If we temporarily ignore the correctness and beauty of the letters her children draw and focus on the content of what they write, we find messages like the following: “Happy Easter to Engineer Talani and Headmistress Montessori. Best wishes to the director, the teacher, and to Doctor Montessori. Children’s House, Via Campania,” and so forth. We do not deny the possibility of teaching reading and writing to preschool children; we even regard it as desirable that a younger child enter school if he is able to read and write. But the teaching should he organized in such a way that reading and writing are necessary for something. If they are used only to write official greetings to the staff or whatever the teacher thinks up (and clearly suggests to them), then the exercise will be purely mechanical and may soon bore the child; his activity will not be manifest in his writing and his budding personality will not grow. Reading and writing must be something the child needs. Here we have the most vivid example of the basic contradiction that appears in the teaching of writing not only in Montessori’s school but in most other schools as well, namely, that writing is taught as a motor skill and not as a complex cultural activity. Therefore, the issue of teaching writing in the preschool years necessarily entails a second requirement: writing must be “relevant to life” — in the same way that we require a “relevant” arithmetic. A second conclusion, then, is that writing should be meaningful for children, that an intrinsic need should be aroused in them, and that. writing should be incorporated into a task that is necessary and relevant for life. Only then can we be certain that it will develop not as a matter of hand and finger habits but as a really new and complex form of speech. The third point that we are trying to advance as a practical conclusion is the requirement that writing be taught naturally. In this respect, Montessori has done a http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (15 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 The Prehistory of Written Language by Lev Vygotsky great deal. She has shown that the motor aspect of this activity can indeed be engaged in in the course of children’s play, and that writing should be “cultivated” rather than “imposed.” She offers a well-motivated approach to the development of writing. Following this path, a child approaches writing as a natural moment in her development, and not as training from without. Montessori has shown that kindergarten is the appropriate setting for teaching reading and writing, and this means that the best method is one in which children do not learn to read and write but in which both these skills are found in play situations. For this it is necessary that letters become elements of children’s life in the same way, for instance, that speech is. In the same way as children learn to speak, they should be able to learn to read and write. Natural methods of teaching reading and writing involve appropriate operations on the child’s environment. Reading and writing should become necessary for her in her play. But what Montessori has done as regards the motor aspects of this skill should now be done in relation to the internal aspect of written language and its functional assimilation. Of course, it is also necessary to bring the child to an inner understanding of writing and to arrange that writing will be organized development rather than learning. For this we can indicate only an extremely general approach: in the same way that manual labor and mastery of line-drawing are preparatory exercises for Montessori in developing writing skills, drawing and play should be preparatory stages in the development of children’s written language. Educators should organize all these actions and the entire complex process of transition from one mode of written language to another. They should follow it through its critical moments up to the discovery of the fact that one can draw not only objects but also speech. If we wished to summarize all these practical requirements and express them as a single one, we could say that children should be taught written language, not just the writing of letters. Table of Contents | Psychology and Marxism | Vygotsky Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/mind/ch08.htm (16 of 16)2004/9/29 上午 11:51:32 Solving Problems in the Teaching of Literacy Cathy Collins Block, SeriesEditor RECENT VOLUMES Help for Struggling Readers: Strategies for Grades 3-8 Michael C. McKenna Reading to Learn: Lessons from Exemplary Fourth-Grade Classrooms ~”
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