Repairing the Broken Juvenile System Discussion

Repairing the Broken Juvenile System Discussion

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Chapter 3 VIGNETTE On September 11, 2001, the United States of America was invaded by a foreign enemy. Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners, two from Boston Logan Airport, one from Dulles Airport, and one from Newark Airport. The terrorists flew one of the planes into the Pentagon, and two were flown into the World Trade Center (Twin Towers) in downtown Manhattan. The fourth airliner was headed for the White House; its passengers took it back from the hijackers, but it eventually crashed in a field killing all aboard. Over 3,000 innocent people working in the Twin Towers and at the Pentagon were killed as a result of the attack as well as the passengers killed in the crashes of all four hijacked airliners. America had been invaded. The invasion has been stamped into our national psyche as the 9/11 terrorists’ attack. Our outrage and fear resulting from the 9/11 invasion caused most Americans to be willing to take almost any steps necessary steps to prevent future terrorists’ attacks. In response to the 9/11 attack, we took a series of dramatic steps to prevent future terrorists’ attacks from foreign invaders. We sent military forces into Afghanistan to destroy terrorists’ camps and bases sponsored by the Taliban, an Afghanistan militant group. Shortly after invading Afghanistan, we invaded Iraq to locate and destroy weapons of mass destruction that our intelligence agencies believed had been stockpiled by the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Saddam was our enemy and we feared that he would allow terrorists from the Mid- east to obtain the weapons and then use them against us. No weapons of mass destructions were found. During the Iraq war, physical torture was used by American agents to interrogate Iraqi prisoners of war. Members of the White House staff and the United States Attorney General attempted to argue that torture was legal. The torture was euphemistically referred to as “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Most Americans were not sympathetic to captured enemy soldiers subjected to torture. Nor were most Americans concerned when our government incarcerated “enemy combatants” without oversight or legal recourse on the part of the individuals imprisoned. At home, we passed the Patriot Act that dramatically expanded the power of the federal government and the ability of federal police agencies to search homes and property and to wiretap phones and Internet communications. We also created the Department of Homeland Security to consolidate federal agencies to assure they would be more efficient at gathering and sharing intelligence at home and abroad. The National Security Agency, with the explicit support of the president and his staff, was allowed to wiretap phones of American citizens without judicial or congressional oversight. Libertarian Congressman from Texas and presidential candidate Ron Paul expressed fears that we are indeed moving to a police state (Conspiracy Planet, 2013): In 2002, I asked my House colleagues a rhetorical question with regard to the onslaught of government growth in the post-September eleventh era: Is America becoming a police state? The question is no longer rhetorical. We are not yet living in a total police state, but it is fast approaching. The seeds of future tyranny have been sown, and many of our basic protections against government have been undermined. The atmosphere since 2001 has permitted Congress to create whole new departments and agencies that purport to make us safer—always at the expense of our liberty. But security and liberty go hand in hand. We may also soon be required to have a common form of personal identification to travel or to vote. Also, legal immigrants in many states are required by law to carry their immigration papers. Failure to provide papers to law enforcement officials in those states can result in one’s arrest. Imagine that you are an American citizen with a heavy foreign accent and you are asked for your immigration papers. A German national CEO of a major corporation in Alabama spent a night in jail because he could not show his immigration papers to local law enforcement officials when asked. Interesting that it is a crime to lie to police officials and if you do not cooperate fully with police during an investigation, you can be charged with obstruction of justice. The next time you walk through an urban area, look at the buildings and take stock of the growing number of digital cameras that are tracking your activities. It is hard to determine the frequency with which personal conversations are recorded by third parties’ mobile phones. We are also reliant on cell phones, e-mail, Twitter, Facebook, and other electronic media for our personal communication. Records of our electronic activities are easily stored for long periods of time and we have had instances when the federal government obtained massive amounts of data and personal records from phone companies with just a request and bit of arm twisting, but without a court order. The phone companies complied in the name of national security. In May 2013, the Justice Department obtained phone records of editors and reporters from the Associated Press to track down intelligence leaks from a person or persons in the federal military/police bureaucracy. This intrusion may severely inhibit our nation’s free press that acts as a watchdog over government. This was done in the name of national security. Most of us succumb passively to the new powers of government and the police. After the recent terrorists’ bombings during the Boston Marathon, the citizens of Boston and its suburbs were told to stay at home and lock down. The citizens of Boston did lock down as requested. Boston and federal police officials thanked people for cooperating. Few voices were heard com- plaining about being ordered to stay at home by the local police during the aftermath of the bombings. Almost everyone passively complied so the police could make them safe again. Most Americans are not fearful of the increased power the government has been handed. Many people say they don’t mind their loss of privacy as they have nothing to hide. This thoughtless attitude causes me to be afraid. In the early 1980s, four of my students who were corrections officers offered a prediction about the near future of corrections. Their “environmental scanning” was based on their professional experience and watching general trends in politics and government. During a conversation that took place over coffee, they predicted that in the next decade imprisonment rates would soar, followed by problems of overcrowding, and then by a prison-building binge. They also thought that the size, number, and sophistication of youth gangs from the inner- city areas would increase; that the number of mentally ill inmates would increase at rates greater than the general inmate population, and that facilities would be constructed or dedicated to managing mentally ill inmates. They also saw a huge investment for medical treatment of inmates in the future and suggested that the AIDS virus would become rather common among prisoners and would be a psychological problem for both inmates and staff. It was obvious to the officers that the rapid expansion of prisons would result in a large group of relatively young, inexperienced officers and administrators. They all predicted the corrections system would respond to the predicted problems only after their impact became so blatant that politicians and policymakers would be forced to take action. Although the predictions were heuristic, they were uncannily accurate. The ability of these young professionals to see the future came from their intuitive ability to “scan the environment.” They understood how environmental conditions, events, forces, and circumstances would alter their department’s purpose, structure, and activities as well as that the criminal justice system is an open system and ultimately governed by environmental forces (Perrow, 1986). Since the officers made their predictions, the rate of incarceration to the adult prison system has gone from approximately 200 inmates per 100,000 general population to over 500 inmates per 100,000. Moreover, the jail incarceration rates have grown from less than 100 inmates per 100,000 population to over 200 inmates per 100,000, and the total number of prisoners in state and federal prisons has soared to 1,367,865 (Stinchcomb, 2005). Although estimates of the percentage of inmates who are mentally ill vary, it is estimated that less than half of the inmates who are in need of mental health treatment receive any meaningful assistance. In addition, the rate of AIDS cases among inmates is about five times higher than the general population, placing a profound burden on medical care units in prisons (National Commission on Correctional Health Care, 2004). In this chapter, we discuss the interdependence of the criminal justice system and its environment. Our focus is on the constraint and impact that environmental forces place on the system. The rapid development and application of information communication technology will have a profound impact on the operations of government and our personal lives. The technology also will have a similarly profound impact on individual privacy and security; it will alter the nature of the workforce in the government and further the growing tendency toward social distance (Asgarkhani, 2005). As we will see, these forces affect the mission of the system and its individual agencies as well as its objectives, policies, procedures, and day-to-day practices. Ismaili (2003), for example, argues that changes in our social, cultural, political, and economic conditions have given rise to the nation’s highly punitive attitudes toward criminal offenders. In addition, we discuss how environmental forces allocate resources and personnel to the criminal justice system. Finally, we argue that environmental forces can be stable or complex and unpredictable; they often push the criminal justice system in contradictory directions. Environmental forces, however, will be the final determinants of the effectiveness and efficiency of that system. Environmental forces impose conflicting demands on members of criminal justice agencies and how those agencies attempt to survive in this complex environment. DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM We define an organization’s environment as any external phenomenon, event, group, individual, or system. This definition can be broken down into finite dimensions to make the concept of the interdependence of an organization and its environment understandable. The environment of an advanced society is at least composed of technological, legal, political, economic, demographic, ecological, and cultural forces (Hall, 1987). Each of these plays a role in creating, maintaining, changing, or purging organizations. As environmental conditions change, demands for goods and services, resources, and support for and opposi- tion to the programs of both public and private organizations also may change. Agencies, public or private, that fail to meet changing demands, expectations, or constraints may suffer severe loss of resources or public support before they catch on. Agencies that fail to catch on may become extinct. We discuss each of the environmental forces and, through the use of examples, examine the effect of each on the criminal justice system. Figure 3.1 displays the environmental con- ditions as forces that affect the criminal justice system. Technology Technology has had many direct and indirect effects on the criminal justice system. The introduction of the automobile into our society is an excellent example. The automobile allowed police agencies to increase the efficiency of patrols. Yet auto- mobiles also became a major social control problem for the criminal justice system: The automobile expanded the range of operations for thieves. The high price of automobiles and auto parts makes them valuable items to steal and resell to “chop shops” and other outlets. Automobiles also create a public safety problem. For example, in 2005, approximately 43,000 people died in highway accidents and other traffic-related incidents. Currently, great efforts and resource expenditures are allocated to reduce highway deaths, such as zero tolerance enforcement for motorists driving under the influence of alcohol. Also, several states have banned the use of cell phones by vehicle drivers because using cell phones while driving distracts drivers and creates a potential traffic safety hazard. The communications revolution allows instant communication of informa- tion. For example, the Law Enforcement Information Network System (LEIN) allows officers to obtain information on suspects and warrants from computers. Computer technology also has facilitated the sharing of large amounts of data for all criminal justice agencies. Particular to police, computer-aided dispatch and records management systems store data that are used to examine crime reports, arrests, and calls for service. The ability to collect and organize such data is the basis for crime analysis, a new discipline in law enforcement that analyzes crime patterns to assist police in everyday operations (Boba, 2005). Video cameras are often mounted on the dashboards of patrol cars to record arrests. Video docu- mentation is especially useful as evidence in “driving while under the influence” arrests and for protecting police officers from false claims of brutality during arrests. It is speculated that being videotaped may change or control the behavior of the police during an arrest. The infamous Rodney King beating at the hands of Los Angeles police was taped by a citizen and received widespread television coverage that likely contributed to subsequent civil protests and riots. The tape also was used as evidence in a subsequent criminal case filed against the police officers; eventually, one of the officers received a federal criminal sentence for violating the civil rights of Mr. King. The judicial system also has benefited from the use of computer technology. Legal research is more efficient, and judges can do a case law search from the bench while court is in session. Most of the nation had the opportunity to watch Judge Lance Ito in the O. J. Simpson criminal trial as he obtained case law on his laptop computer. Theoretically, this instant access to information should have sped up the proceedings, but it may also hold judges to higher standards, cause them to suffer an information overload, and slow the process down or create confusion. In the Simpson case, Judge Ito’s chronic use of his laptop to search cases may have slowed the progress of the case, often by causing lengthy delays. Computer technology also impacts the corrections system with the devel- opment of electronic tethers that can be strapped to offenders to bolster proba- tion surveillance. Higher-risk offenders who would ordinarily be incarcerated can now be safely monitored under community supervision programs. Theoretically, this use of electronic monitoring can reduce prison and jail popula- tions and increase the use of community corrections. Concurrently, agencies must create technology-based systems and train practitioners to utilize the innovations. From the standpoint of public safety, many states provide the names and addresses of criminals released from prison on the state’s web site. This approach is especially popular for gaining information regarding so-called sex offenders and sexual predators. However, the computer information age has created an opportunity for an array of innovative high-tech crimes. Grau (1999), for example, describes the abil- ity of “computer hackers” to destroy linked systems out of malice and to penetrate online banking, finance, and investment systems to steal money without guns. Computer crimes, such as identity theft, stalking by sexual predators, cyberbullying, and industrial espionage (Hinduja, 2006), have risen to the extent that it is common for law enforcement agencies at every level to have separate units that specialize in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes. In this regard, cell phones and smartphones have dramatically increased the efficiency of our ability to communicate at great distances as well as store and transmit enormous amounts of information. Even countries with low economic bases have been able to integrate cell and smartphone technology into their daily lives. With this blessing comes an array of problems, such as the misuse of cell and smartphones in prisons. Moreover, cell phones are handy tools for drug dealers and other criminal actors who benefit from an efficient and inexpensive communication system. New laws, policies, procedures, and practices must be created to deal with computer-based theft from electronic banking systems. Criminal investigators must have expertise in tracking crimes created on the World Wide Web or the Internet. Police patrol patterns must now consider protecting bank customers who use automated banking machines. The list of technological changes that will impact the criminal justice system could be expanded here. But the point is clear: Technology impacts the inner workings of the criminal justice system and changes the demands it must face. The most recent technological advance that impacts the criminal justice system is the use of so-called DNA as forensics evidence: Among the many new tools that science has provided for the analysis of forensic evidence is the powerful and controversial analysis of deox- yribonucleic acid, or DNA, the material that makes up the genetic code of most organisms. DNA analysis, also called DNA typing or DNA profiling, examines DNA found in physical evidence such as blood, hair, and semen, and determines whether it can be matched to DNA taken from specific individuals (NIJ 1996, P1). DNA evidence has routinely been applied to individuals convicted of usually violent crimes such as rape and murder and has led to the reversal of convictions of 1,090 offenders to date in the United States (National Registry, 2013). The use of DNA evidence also has strengthened the prosecution of criminal cases where DNA is present. Also, great doubt has been placed upon the values of “confessions” without physical evidence present, and jurors now expect to see prosecutors present more physical and scientific evidence in jury trials. Law Legislation and court decisions provide the basic rules and authority for the crim- inal justice system. The mandate for all public agencies lies in state and federal statutes. As discussed in Chapter 2, an agency’s mission is directed by its legislated mandate. Criminal justice agencies are also bound by laws that direct their activ- ities. Procedures for arrest, pretrial detention, bail bond, and adjudication proce- dures are often laid out, in part, by statute. In short, the criminal justice system is framed with legislation. The legal definition of crime is, of course, statutory. Criminal sentences and procedures for sentencing are directed by legislation. California recently created the “three strikes and you’re out” legislation, which mandates a life sentence for conviction of a third felony within a category of crimes. Thought to prevent crime, three strikes has had a profound impact on jail and prison populations and has created a critical mass of geriatric prisoners who require extensive and expensive medical care. Offenders facing three- strikes sentencing have no incentive to plea bargain for a reduced charge and will invariably seek jury trials. This pattern has created backlogs for criminal courts, increased workloads for the prosecutor’s office, and impacted the popula- tion capacity of local jails. It may be worth the cost if the three-strikes sentencing laws reduce crime. However, researchers using large data sets to analyze the impact of the three-strikes sentencing laws observed no significant impact on crime reduction in jurisdictions where it is applied (Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vier- aitis, 2004). A common theme among states has been to attempt to reduce the rate of domestic violence by passing legislation that requires perpetrators of domestic violence to be arrested. Research has shown that in at least one juris- diction, arrest rates have increased, and the incidence of domestic violence has decreased (Simpson, Bouffard, and Hickman, 2006). Perhaps the most dramatic legislation to affect the operations of the criminal justice system is the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act was passed by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001. The Act was created as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The Act allows broader authorization to tap phone messages or other electronic means of communication and includes authority to tap “roving calls,” targeting individuals rather than specific phones. The Act also expanded the use of sub- poenas against Internet service providers and required information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence communities. Finally, the Act also defined as a crime the facilitating of terrorist acts, whether or not the facilitator knew his or her activities were tied to a potential terrorist act. It also authorizes the attorney general to issue search warrants against terrorist suspects. In short, the power of law enforcement vis-a-vis constitutional constraints was expanded dramatically. Case law—actual court cases that review activities of criminal justice practi- tioners—impacts powerfully on criminal justice agencies. Case law can be a review of criminal court cases by state and/or federal appellate or supreme courts; it also can emanate from civil litigation pled against criminal justice agencies. Typically, case laws reviewing criminal cases stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court are the most salient and have national impact. For example, Ten- nessee v. Garner (1985) restricts the ability of a police officer to shoot a fleeing felon. Furman v. Georgia (1972) in effect ended capital punishment in the United States for over a decade. Civil litigation has also had a powerful impact on the criminal justice system. Successful litigation against agencies may impose monetary and/or injunctive relief against the agency (defendant) in favor of the individual or group bringing suit against the agency (plaintiff). In a recent U.S. Supreme Court case (Blakeley v. Washington), the Supreme Court invalidated a sentence imposed under the State of Washington’s sentencing guidelines system. Basically, the court reasoned that giving longer sentences to offenders for “aggravating circumstances” was unconstitutional because sentencing for such exoge- nous circumstances without due process (a trial) violated the offenders’ basic constitutional rights. This ruling caused all states and the federal system to recon- sider and change their system of sentencing to conform to the Blakeley ruling. Monetary relief provides the plaintiff with a sum of money, paid by the defendant agency, to rectify the harm done to the individual bringing the suit. Monetary relief can serve to compensate for the actual damages received by the plaintiff or punitive damages against the agency to punish the agency for its actions. Significant monetary awards against an agency typically cause the agency to change its practices. Injunctive relief is, in effect, a court order requiring the agency to make changes in its practices. Moreover, courts have often taken con- trol of agencies through injunctive relief and appointed a court monitor who administers the agency de facto until the required changes have been made. Agencies also enter into a negotiated consent decree, an agreement with the court to make changes in the future, as a response to civil litigation. Civil litigation can be filed with state or federal courts; state court litigation is based on simple common law tort action. Typically, states provide criminal justice practitioners with immunity for simple negligence because it is expected they will make mistakes—acts of negligence—in their complex environment. Thus, a plaintiff would have to show that agency members acted with gross negligence, wanton or deliberate indifference, or in a criminal manner that caused damages to the plaintiff. Cases that most dramatically impact criminal justice agencies are federal cases pled under United States Code (USC), section 1983, enacted in 1871. The essence of the USC 1983 is to prevent govern- mental agencies from circumventing “under the color of law” the constitu- tional rights of citizens: “Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation … subjects … any citizen of the United States or other persons under the jurisdiction thereof … shall be liable to the party injured.” Suits pled under USC 1983 are referred to generically as federal civil rights suits and have implications for agencies in all states. The major body of law referred to as “corrections law,” which provided limited constitutional rights to prison- ers and dramatically changed the operations of corrections, has its base in case law emanating from civil litigation (Baro, 1988), often based on USC 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Civil Rights Act created by Congress in 1964 also had an impact on the criminal justice system and opened the door to civil litigation against criminal justice agencies. The requirement of equal opportunity also changed the person- nel composition of criminal justice agencies so that they include more minorities. Women are now police and corrections officers, positions that were traditionally male. Policies and procedures protecting minorities from racial and sexual harass- ment have to be developed within criminal justice agencies. In some prison systems, preservice training now includes courses for female corrections officers to help them cope with the unique problems they face in male prisons. Changes in the legal sector of the environment have thus created a new set of constraints to which the criminal justice system must adapt. In response to the civil litigation changes, criminal law, and increased departmental accountability on the part of police practitioners, many police departments have hired their own lawyers to provide legal guidance and assistance (Archbold, 2006). Case law has also had an impact on the court system itself. The evolution of suits in the criminal justice system has created a snowball effect; suits ranging from gender and race discrimination by employees and potential employees to tort and civil rights actions by inmates are now common and have dramatically increased the workload of the courts. In effect, case law has changed past prac- tices and rules of the court to allow more access to address grievances. Economic Conditions Clearly, the resources available to public bureaucracies limit the numbers and scope of these organizations. In a highly productive society, a great many resources are available, but many organizations are required to produce and distribute goods and services and to regulate the production and distribution systems. These organizations compete for resources, however plentiful. In our society, business cycles cause production and employment rates to fluctuate, and the resources allocated to public agencies fluctuate along with business cycles. Even though it derives its funds from government rather than the mar- ketplace, the criminal justice system is affected by the business cycle because it competes with private and public organizations and with other regulatory agen- cies for existing resources. For example, during times of high unemployment, criminal justice agencies have a large labor pool from which to choose and have the opportunity to be highly selective in recruiting personnel. During per- iods of prosperity, criminal justice agencies have little difficulty in obtaining resources but cannot be highly selective in personnel recruiting because members of the labor force have so many career choices. The recent economic crises—the great recession of 2008—have caused major shortfalls in governmental budgets. States, for example, have been searching for ways to reduce spending in order to balance their budgets. The dramatic increase in the percentage of state budgets allocated to corrections, especially prisons, has caused legislators to reconsider earlier tough criminal sentencing. Also, the high cost of medical and mental health treatment for inmates is causing legislators to rethink prisons as a solution to crime problems. The wealth of a community also can affect the level of professionalism of public safety officers, the technological sophistication of the public safety system, and the total investment in public safety made by a community. It is suggested that per capita income of a community is a good predictor of the size of the budget for law enforcement agencies as well as the rate of officers per community (Holmes et. al., 2008). Economic conditions may influence the criminal justice system in other ways. To the extent that unemployment rates affect crime rates and jail and prison populations, economic conditions affect the workload of criminal justice agencies. The research on unemployment rates and crime rates is conflicting (Thompson, Svirdoff, and McElroy, 1981). However, Belknap (1989) suggests that income inequality may be a better indicator of crime rate than poverty or unemployment. The differences in criminal participation among young Black and White males may reflect, in part, differences in labor market conditions. Also, the increasing rate of incarceration of African Americans may be linked to labor market conditions (Meyers and Simms, 1989). Fearn (2005) also finds that offenders in communities with extreme income inequality typically receive harsher sentences than offenders in other jurisdictions. Research also suggests that homicide rates may be linked to economic discrimination against social groups (Meisner, 1989) and that larceny and other property crimes may be the result of a society’s growth in material wealth (Shichor, 1990). Moreover, the literature indicates that prison populations and sentencing rates increase as unemployment increases, and vice versa (Yeager, 1979). In spite of the lack of certainty in this area of research, it serves as a good example of how environmental conditions beyond the control of the criminal justice system can affect it. Workhouses were built in London during the fifteenth century to incarcerate large numbers of unemployed and vagrant citizens (Barnes and Teeters, 1959). In this historical instance, a corrections system was created in response to the economic conditions. Demographic Factors Age, sex, race, ethnicity, and number of people in a community all have an impact on organizations. For example, the majority of criminal activity is carried out by individuals under the age of 25 (Reid, 1982). A community with a high proportion of individuals under the age of 25 will probably have a relatively high crime rate. Large cities tend to have higher per capita crime rates than smaller communities, and cities with more citizens of lower rather than higher economic status also have higher per capita crime rates (Sutherland and Cressey, 1978). It is interesting that Fearn (2005) finds that offenders receive harsher criminal sentences in communities with large proportions of evangelicals or Christian fundamentalists than in other communities. A sudden influx or exodus of people creates a new set of demographic characteristics within the community that, in turn, can alter crime patterns. For example, an increase in the population of a state generally indicates that the state will soon be building additional prisons (Benton and Silberstein, 1983). The flight of working- and middle-class populations to the suburbs has left inner cities with the poor and minorities, creating a new clientele for urban police departments. The flight to the suburbs has also significantly eroded the tax base for major cities (Danzinger and Weinstein, 1976; Frey, 1979; Grubb, 1982) and has limited resources for their criminal justice systems at a time when they have to deal with a problematic population. In addition, Jaworsky and Park (2009) find that violent crime rates for cities of more than 250,000 were three times higher than suburban counties. They also argue that flights to the suburbs leave inner cities with concentrations of poverty where young residents view crime as normative. These factors lead to an easy adoption of criminal lifestyles for young individuals. Migration and immigration patterns obviously impact demographics. Histor- ically, industrial expansion in the cities created mass migration from rural farm communities and encouraged immigration from foreign nations (Faris, 1948). Groups of individuals from different cultures, often with limited skills but a great will to work, converge in industrial cities seeking employment. A dramatic increase in the population of a city automatically increases its crime rate and presses the system for additional services; agencies are required to deal with cul- tures that often differ profoundly from the dominant, established culture. The unique behaviors and moral codes of merging cultures manifest in a variety of unfamiliar behaviors, some of which will be offensive and considered criminal by the dominant culture and will, in effect, create more crime (Sellin, 1934). One of the nation’s current problems is 11 million illegal immigrants. Debate has been ongoing in the U.S. Congress on how to deal with this immigrant population. A significant number of the immigrants are referred to as “guest workers,” and they play a significant role in our economy. However, the cities that border Mexico and port cities in Florida have to deal with the influx of illegal immigrants. In many of the border towns in California and Texas, citizens complain of the possible criminal threat posed to them by the influx of illegal immigrants. Armed vigilante groups have formed in many border cities to pro- tect their borders. Some legislators want to construct a wall along the border to keep unwanted guests out. The implications for order and law enforcement are complicated, as is the proposed legislation to deal with the problem of illegal immigrants. The Mexican government’s military battle with its drug lords often spills across the border into border towns in Texas and Arizona. Resulting anti- immigrant sentiment has driven Arizona to pass legislation giving local police more authority to arrest illegal aliens. No additional resources, however, were provided by the state to local governments to implement their new mandate. Cultural Conditions Culture can be defined briefly as the collective norms, values, symbols, behaviors, and expectations of a society’s members. Ultimately, a society’s political and economic systems reflect its culture. Thus, laws are codified social norms. More- over, the roles attributed to a society’s organizations are based in its culture. In other words, the missions, constraints, images, symbols, and validity of organiza- tions are rooted in a society’s cultural makeup. Society’s dictates are imposed on bureaucracies through its political–legal system, which is linked to its cultural and social fabric. This is especially true for the criminal justice system, which is expected to carry out its duty of providing safety for the public in a manner that receives public approval. American culture, however, is heterogeneous and dynamic, and the demands on and expectations of its institutions often conflict. During the racial riots of the 1960s and the anti-Vietnam War riots of the early 1970s, for example, many citizens were outraged by the conduct of the police, and charges of racism and brutality were common. In general, liberals viewed the social- control problems as a result of poverty, racism, and a justice system biased against the lower class. Conservatives viewed the civil disobedience, rioting, and looting simply as lawless conduct and advocated the increased use of police force to deal with it (Rosch, 1985). Moreover, even when we are incarcerating offenders at a high rate, most citizens are not supportive of allocating funds for more prison construction (Cohn, Rust, and Steen, 2006). These conflicting views of crime and civil disorder are an excellent example of the lack of consistency in norms and values among the members of our society. Our cultural mix can create homogeneous or heterogeneous demands (Hall, 1987), depending on the issues at hand and our collective or individual perceptions of the issues. When demands are heterogeneous, government and organizations must work to appease or mitigate conflicting interests or must ignore one set of interests in favor of others. A striking historical example of our conflicting norms can be seen in the attempt to eliminate the consumption of alcohol through federal legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment (the Volstead Act), passed in 1919 and repealed in 1933 (the Twenty-First Amendment), created the nation’s infamous period of prohibition. Basically, a coalition of politically powerful moral and religious groups created the amendment, which was intended to make the nation righteous by preventing a large number of Americans from consuming alcohol. The law forbidding the consumption of alcoholic beverages for recreational purposes was to be implemented by the criminal justice system at the federal, state, and local levels. However, alcoholic beverages were nonetheless consumed by “good citizens” from all walks of life. Beer and gin were often homemade, but bootleggers and members of organized crime supplied most of the beverages to the consuming public. Because the values and preferences of large numbers of Americans seemingly were ignored by the prohibition lobby, the criminal justice system was, in effect, mandated to enforce a law that a great number of people would not follow. While the amendment ignored the wishes of “drinking” citizens, local criminal justice systems ignored the amendment; stories from the Roaring Twenties recount the corruption of local law enforcement officials who allowed speakeas- ies to market beer and liquor openly. Hence, the power the “moral minority” had over others was mitigated in favor of the “drinking minority” by the practices of local criminal justice systems. In many respects, our present attempts to control the consumption of recre- ational drugs, such as marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, resemble our efforts at prohibiting the use of alcohol (Warren, 1981). Again, a large minority of Amer- ican citizens forms a lucrative market that attracts suppliers of illegal recreational drugs. Traditional organized crime has its share of the illegal market, and new criminal cartels have been formed to supply illegal drugs to consumers. Despite the war on drugs, increased sentences for the sale and use of drugs, and intensi- fied enforcement efforts, we seem unable to prevent the marketing of a product demanded by a substantial number of citizens. However, while a significant number of citizens believe that harsh sentencing for the sale or use of drugs will lead to decreased consumption, a significant number of citizens also doubt this and often rally for legalization of drugs. The outcome of the cultural conflict toward the use of coercive force to reduce drug consumption has contributed to the constantly growing rate of incarceration, the need for more prisons, and pressure for more resources for the criminal justice system. Ecological Conditions Ecological factors are components of the environment, such as climate, geographi- cal location, size of a community, and its economic base—industrial, service, or agrarian. Ecological factors make a major contribution to the total environment of an organization and subsequently affect its mission and constraints. A small city in the midst of a farm area is profoundly different from a small city with an industrial base, and both are profoundly different from a large industrial commu- nity. Small agricultural communities tend to have homogeneous cultures and a history of relative stability. The criminal justice system in small communities typically does not receive mixed signals from community members. An immediate link between criminal justice agencies and community members exists because citizens typically have access to political leaders and criminal justice officials and probably associate with them consistently on a social basis. From an operational point of view, most community members are probably well known to the local police, and many problems are handled informally based on local preference rather than on formal procedures. As communities change from agrarian to industrial, migration patterns bring in new citizens who may have values different from those of the longtime resi- dents, thus creating a heterogeneous environment for the criminal justice system. In addition, crime patterns may change, and an increased number of social con- trol problems may require formal rather than informal processing. Large urban industrial communities offer an even more complex environment in which crim- inal justice agencies must work. Values of community members and their demands for services from governmental and criminal justice agencies may vary greatly. Social control problems are handled with formality. Criminal justice bureaucracies become large, and their members may not be easily accessible to citizens. Therefore, direct input from community members into criminal justice agencies may be limited. Geographical conditions also have an impact on both the services demanded in a community and the resources available. In northern cities, winter climates create traffic hazards. Western areas have forest fires and droughts. Coastal areas or lakes and streams present safety hazards. Areas that attract tourists have distinc- tive social control problems. Las Vegas, for example, attracts more than its share of drifters and criminals as well as legitimate tourists looking for excitement. Lit- tle imagination is needed to consider how the problems the Las Vegas criminal justice system faces compare with those of stable industrial or rural communities. As discussed earlier, communities in California and Texas that border Mexico have a unique set of problems as the result of illegal immigrants traveling through their communities on their way to other communities in the country to meet their economic needs. Political Conditions Political conditions can affect an organization directly through pressures from constituents and clients and indirectly through governmental action. In theory, this linkage is established through representative government. However, election results rarely produce significant effects on public policy, and nonelectoral linkages are often the most powerful (Houston and Parsons, 2006). The govern- mental response to political conditions can be passed on to organizations and agencies in a number of ways. To focus on public agencies, governments can alter agency budgets, change mandates, alter the composition of top administra- tive personnel—which often happens after an election—or write legislation that changes the purpose or power base of a bureaucracy. On the other hand, legisla- tion alone may not have a significant impact on agency operations. Research suggests that legislation requiring rehabilitation as a goal for state correctional agencies may not positively affect such an outcome (Kelly, Mueller, and Hemmens, 2004). Court decisions that affect the operations or mission of an agency are made in the existing political climate and are not exempt from political forces. As we saw earlier in the chapter, a body of case law has evolved as individual rights have become a deep political concern. Political pressure by interest groups can be placed directly on criminal justice agencies rather than through the governmental structure (Houston and Parsons, 2006). For example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) has been successful in causing police agencies to be concerned with the safety hazards created by drunk drivers. The MADD group has been able to focus national attention on the highway safety problem created by drunk drivers, which has, in turn, pressured courts to impose stiffer penalties and police to increase the frequency of arrests of those driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In another example, the national media exposure along with pressure from child protective groups have resulted in the implementation of the AMBER Alert system that provides infor- mation to law enforcement and the general public about child abductions. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is a well-organized political force that has historically placed direct pressure on police agencies for fair treatment of African Americans and for equal opportunity employment within criminal justice agencies. In addition, the American Friends Service Committee (1971) has a history of attempting to bring humane reform to our prison system. Finally, pleas from the public at large often ask for tougher criminal sentencing. Judges, as elected officials, are vulnerable to such pressures. Because demands placed on the political– legal system and ultimately on the criminal justice system often conflict, criminal justice agencies have difficulty establishing priorities. Jus- tice may, therefore, be applied inconsistently within a particular criminal justice system and differently from system to system. As a result, some dissatisfaction with the performance of the criminal justice system will always be present among certain members, groups, or forces in its environment. Fearn (2005) sug- gests that community differences impact the severity of criminal sentencing. Much of what has been discussed in this section on political conditions within the environment is based on cultural considerations. Cultural views and values become political when we try to operationalize them or make them part of the offi- cial domain of government. For example, Sample and Kadleck (2008) find that cur- rent sex offender laws, such as requiring sex offenders to register, is a product of legislators’ personal opinions about sex offenders as informed by public opinion and media reporting of events. A society utilizes its political–legal system to perpet- uate its most basic values. Hence, the political–legal system becomes a conduit between the forces of the environment and governmental agencies by rendering the conflicting demands and needs of the environment into manageable mandates for governmental agencies. Thus, criminal justice agencies are linked directly to and must be most responsive to the political environment in which they function. Moreover, implicit up to now is the fact that environmental conditions merge and interact within the political environment and create or manifest a political climate. We have already seen how environmental conditions create demands and constraints on government, which, in turn, places demands, con- straints, and expectations on public bureaucracies. Often the policies, activities, or subsequent outcomes of government or its agencies impact environmental conditions, thus creating a new set of problems and demands. For example, the fear of crime and the war on drugs, often fueled by political leaders, has led to a prison-building and incarceration binge, which in turn has expanded the number of corrections officers across the country. Public concern and support for the prison system typically emerge after a major prison riot (Stinchcomb, 2005). The fear of personal liability resulting from chronic litigation and concern for wages and working conditions have advanced collective bargaining for correc- tions officers. Corrections officers’ unions in several states have expanded; they are well funded and sophisticated in influencing both the formal and informal political systems. In short, the unions have the political strength to lobby openly for legislation, support legislators and governors, contribute large sums of money to political candidates, and fund public relations activities to vest their interest directly and indirectly into the political process. Prison guards, who once lacked professional and often personal status, have now become politically powerful, a predictable outcome not foreseen by policymakers or political leaders, but result- ing from environmental conditions funneled through the political environment. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT The political environment of the criminal justice system can be thought of as a complex decision-making apparatus containing both formal and informal overlap- ping subsystems (Fairchild and Webb, 1985). The formal political system includes leg- islative bodies at the federal, state, and local levels. These bodies pass legislation that determines and limits the operation of the criminal justice system; they also allocate to criminal justice agencies resources that can have a substantial impact on operations. Legislative bodies, in theory, pass on demands from the general public to public service agencies. They also are subjected to the potential influence of pressure groups, whose goal is to influence the policies or operations of the crimi- nal justice system (Fairchild, 1981; Stolz, 1985). Moreover, and not surprisingly, legislators’ personal views, on matters such as criminal sentencing and rehabilita- tion, often frame legislative outcomes (Cook and Lane, 2009). The court system, although it is a component of the criminal justice system, also is a part of the formal political system. The court system, especially the federal system, regulates the operations of criminal justice agencies. Regulation imposed by the courts is, in theory, based on statutory and case law and consti- tutional law, much of which is constantly being redefined by new court decisions or case law. In making sure the criminal justice system operates within the law, the courts are theoretically blind to demands of the general public or changes in cultural and other environmental factors. A significant body of research, how- ever, suggests that judges, whether elected or appointed, make decisions congru- ent with the values they bring to the office. Their decision making often reflects the regional or political values they have acquired more than a strict interpreta- tion of the law, hence creating a hybrid or a political/legal system (Cole, 2002; Frazier and Block, 1982; Kolonski and Mendelsohn, 1970). The informal political system comprises those pressures and demands that are placed directly on the criminal justice system. These pressures support or oppose existing programs or practices or they may demand new programs or services. In other words, individuals, groups, or organizations may bypass the formal political system and focus directly on a criminal justice agency—or attack the formal political structure and agency simultaneously—to bring about a desired effect. In the previous section on political environmental factors, examples were given of change that was imposed on the criminal justice system by direct pressure from such groups. Informal pressure can also be placed on the criminal justice system by legis- lative bodies. Short of writing new laws, legislatures may voice support for, or opposition to, agency programs or practices. In short, governmental bodies may interfere with the routine operations of an agency as well as define the agency’s official goal or mission (Guyot, 1985). Most state legislatures have both house and senate committees on corrections, police, or the courts. Such committees may show intense interest in a criminal justice agency program or operation and may voice an opinion on appropriate agency philosophy, policies, or proce- dures. Such an opinion itself may create a response from the agency without official legislation. In Michigan, for example, the state senate committee on criminal justice argued for the development of a military-style camp for young inmates. The state department of corrections, initially opposed to the boot camp, eventually established one boot camp structured to house 150 inmates in order to appease the committee. Often, antiquated prisons planned for closing have been kept open by legislators to protect the local employment opportunities and jobs for their voters. The formal and informal political systems faced by the criminal justice agen- cies are not mutually exclusive. The example just given shows how members of the formal political system exert informal influence. We can also return to MADD to see other ways in which the two systems mix or overlap. MADD can consistently pressure police agencies to increase the frequency with which they arrest drunk drivers and can pressure judges to give out tough sentences while lobbying legislators to toughen legislation against drunk drivers and provide increased resources to improve anti-drunk-driving efforts. Agencies may respond directly to pressure from the public or from a partic- ular constituency and plan to effect an operational or programmatic change. They may first, however, approach the formal system for support by asking leg- islative bodies for additional funding (Cordner and Hudzik, 1983) or statutory support for their plan. In this manner, the formal political system is pressured by the agency to respond to demands from the informal political system. The move to community policing, or the foot patrol program, is a rich and interest- ing example of political interactions among the community, the police, and city government. In Flint, Michigan, an industrial town that had unemployment rates of up to 23 percent in the 1980s, the crime rate rose rapidly, and community members demanded increased police service. City funds were unavailable because of the economic problems, but the Mott Foundation, a local organization created to assure the quality of life in Flint, funded the establishment of a foot patrol exper- iment. Funds from Mott were used to pay foot patrol police officers’ salaries for a three-year period. The program was evaluated periodically through direct interviews with resi- dents in the foot patrol neighborhoods. Although the foot patrol program did not seem to affect crime rates, it provided residents with increased perceptions of safety, and they favored the availability of foot patrol officers (Trojanowicz, 1983). When the Mott Foundation grant ran out, the community voted over- whelmingly for a tax increase to continue the program as a permanent part of the police force. The foot patrol program was not overly popular, however, with many police administrators or members of the city government. Although they were pleased with the tax increase, police executives and members of the city govern- ment continued to struggle to have the monies allocated lumped into the total police department budget rather than earmarked for foot patrol operations. When administrators also observed that the foot patrol officers were gaining, or had the capacity to gain, credibility and political influence among the constitu- ents in the neighborhoods they served, they became concerned with the possible loss of bureaucratic control over the foot patrol officers (Trojanowicz, Steele, and Trojanowicz, 1986). These officers became, in effect, capable of being significant figures in the informal political system themselves through the influence and credibility they built within the community. Political forces within police departments and city governments often mitigate against the establishment of community policing. It usually takes extraordinary funding from government, such as the Federally Legislated Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that provided $30 billion to fund community policing and to initiate inno- vative policing programs (He, Zhao, and Lovrich, 2005). The funds were used to add an additional 100,000 police officers across the country and created the office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS program) to distribute the funds to state and local police agencies. Clearly, the political environment varies greatly in influence, structure, and form. In small rural communities, for example, criminal justice actors may be subjected to constant community input because they are part of the local social system. Citizens may be able to get something done by attending city council meetings, banging on the police chief’s desk, or seeking out the judge at the local restaurant. In large urban communities, criminal justice agencies are shielded from such direct input from community members. Citizen complaints are handled through formal channels with much red tape. Influence is gained only through concerted interest group efforts, which usually include pressure through the formal political system and pressure on the criminal justice system itself (Olsen, 1973). State and federal agencies, especially corrections systems, are large, bureaucratic, and distant from the general public. They are, therefore, protected from the infor- mal political system. To the extent they are vulnerable to political influence, it is most likely to be from the formal political system. Public agencies take their general mandates from the political system and are constrained by the legal and budgetary controls of the formal political system. However, they are subject to other pressures, demands, and constraints from clientele and constituencies served, competing and cooperating agencies, and other specific elements of their task envi- ronment. In the following section, we attempt to identify these groups. TASK ENVIRONMENT ELEMENTS SPECIFIC TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM The task environment of an agency can be defined generally as the forces in the environment that are related directly to the goal-setting and goal-directed activi- ties of the criminal justice system (Steers, 1977). The task environment is com- posed of a number of groups, agencies, and organizations that fall roughly into six categories: beneficiaries, funders, providers of nonfiscal resources, providers of complementary services, competitors, and legitimizers (Lauffer, 1984). Funders include governmental bodies that allocate scarce resources to public agencies. Planned activities, programs, goals, agency problems, and future challenges will be reviewed by funders before allocating budget requests. Competitors are other public agencies competing for limited resources. With the move to privatization, firms such as Corrections Corporation of America are competing for tax dollars to provide correctional services (Mays and Gray, 1996). The public at large can be considered beneficiaries. However, particular groups often demand specific services from the system. Merchants want business districts to be safe and orderly for customers, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving was successful in requiring stricter enforcement and sentencing of drunk drivers. Employees are major beneficiaries. Police and corrections officers’ unions are common. In addition to bargaining for wages, they often play a role in policy development and attempt to force bureaus to alter their practices toward employees (Swanson, Territo, and Taylor, 1997). New personnel bring their own values and beliefs into an organization; to the extent their values vary from existing values, they may affect goals, practices, and decision making within the system (Eisenstein, 1973). It was hoped, for example, that upgrading the educational levels of police officers—that is, making a baccalaureate degree com- mon—would make officers nonracist and able to relate well to members of the communities they served (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973b). Affirmative action also has had an impact on particular aspects of criminal justice agencies. Hiring women police and corrections officers has caused agen- cies to alter physical requirements for recruitment, including physical fitness test- ing for entry (Booth and Harwick, 1984). More important, perhaps, the mixing of genders has forced agencies to provide methods to assimilate female personnel and accord them professional status (Price, 1974). Agencies must now provide procedures to protect each gender from sexual harassment from the other, espe- cially when one has a position of authority over the other. Criminal offenders can easily—if not ironically—be considered nonfiscal resource providers. The type and number of offenders clearly have an impact on the operations of crimi- nal justice agencies. The emergence of street gangs causes police agencies to alter policies, procedures, and resources. Antigang units are often formed to respond to the gangs as a crime threat or in response to public fears (Center for Assessment of the Juvenile Justice System, 1982). The increased arrests of gang members affect the corrections system, especially large jails and prisons, because gangs tend to coalesce in correctional institutions and attempt to rule them (Irwin, 1980; Jacobs, 1983a). Increasing the number of arrests—as a result of increased crime, public pressure on police, luck, or skill—will affect operations throughout the criminal justice system. The populations of local jails and lockups will increase, court dockets and caseloads of prosecuting attorneys will expand, and, perhaps plea bargaining will favor defendants more than usual as a result of high caseloads. Finally, prison populations may increase. Changes in the seriousness and type of criminal activity may affect the operational goals and procedures of agencies. In our example of street gangs, allocating additional law enforcement resources to that problem will take resources away from other activities. Response time to burglaries or accidents may increase and traffic control may be reduced as resources are taken away from these areas to deal with street gangs. Prison administrators may become more concerned with maintaining order than with treatment or rehabilitation in institutions populated by street gang members. Historically, mentally ill citizens were confined in state mental institutions; in effect, they were controlled through incarceration. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, mental health professionals and legislators moved away from confin- ing mentally ill peop le for long periods of time and instituted a program of com- munity mental health, keeping mentally ill citizens out of institutions unless they posed a substantial danger to themselves or others. This change came about in part in response to the recognition of abuses and arbitrary decision making within mental institutions. In addition, mental health professionals reasoned, individuals suffering from mental problems could be cured only in the commu- nity, where they must ultimately live and survive. State mental hospitals were thus emptied during the 1970s, and since then, strict legal constraints have kept mental hospital admissions at a low level. Mentally ill citizens who behave in criminal or antisocial ways now must be controlled and cared for by the criminal justice system instead of by the state mental health systems (Guy, Platt, and Zwerling, 1985). As a consequence, a growing number of jail and prison inmates across the nation are mentally ill (Steadman et al., 1984). In analyzing the data from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics in the Survey of Jail Inmates, researchers found that approximately 16 percent of inmates incarcerated in our nation’s jails in 1983 reported symp- toms of mental illness or prior institutionalization in a mental hospital. It has been reported that nearly 70 percent of jail inmates report symptoms of mental illness (Hartwell and Orr, 2000). In addition, standards of care for inmates imposed on jails and prisons by the courts require that they be provided with adequate psychiatric and medical assistance (Embert, 1986). In effect, the role of the local jail and prison has been modified by changes within the mental health system, specifically by the closure of mental hospitals that housed the mentally ill for decades. Policies, procedures, and behaviors of jail and correc- tional institution employees must also be changed to perform the new tasks imposed by this aspect of the environment. Components of the system and individual agencies become providers of complementary services, and they are all interdependent. Changes in the prac- tices or priorities of one component or agency will have an effect on the other agencies. Moreover, human service agencies often become complementary pro- viders of services because they often have problems and cases in common with the criminal justice system. Dealing with child abuse cases is a clear example of substantive interactions among the criminal justice and social welfare agencies. Legitimization, finally, derives directly from legislation, preentry training, and educational requirements. Practices, performance, and personal standards can be dictated by legislation and implemented in part by mandated training and educa- tion. Most states have established standards and curricula for police training acad- emies. The academies almost always are required to accept only applicants who meet personal, physical, mental, and emotional standards. Federal agencies and many state correctional agencies require extensive training before a trainee works in the system. Legitimization can be derived indirectly from professional organizations as well as unions. Professional organizations, such as the American Correctional Association, American Jail Association, and state and local bar associations, attempt to set standards for their profession. It can be argued that the popularity of criminal justice programs at colleges and universities across the country has allowed higher education to provide legitimacy for the criminal justice system in much the same way law schools legitimize the legal profession. A general analysis of the dynamics of an organization’s environment provides an understanding of the general nature of environmental forces. Understanding environmental forces is pivotal to administrators in understanding the expected role of their agencies. In the next section, we add another dimension to our understanding of a system’s environment by exploring the types of environments states faced by organizations. ENVIRONMENTAL STATES The specific environment of an organization can range from simple to complex and from static to dynamic. A simple environment is one in which the exter- nal forces that affect the organization, or with which the organization must inter- act, are few in number and are relatively homogeneous. Conversely, an organization that deals with a number of heterogeneous external factors exists within a relatively complex environment (Duncan, 1972). Each environ- mental state will affect the behavior of an organization differently. Police agencies that work in small communities with stable populations and little demo- graphic change face a limited number of problems, most of which are recurring and predictable. The small-town cop probably knows many of the citizens personally, knows who the troublemakers are and where trouble spots are, can predict the behaviors and expectations of the political leaders, and is in a position to influence aspects of his or her environment. If such a “Sleepy Hollow” begins to change demographically, economically, or culturally, the environment becomes increasingly complex. If, for example, a relatively large firm moves into “Sleepy Hollow,” the population will increase, additional housing will be built, individuals with different ethnic backgrounds may settle there, traffic pat- terns will change, and crime and interpersonal conflict may increase. The police agency may need to expand, to be concerned with the behavior of the new community members (at least initially), and to cope with altered traffic patterns, more taverns, and tavern patrons. The environment for the small-town cops thus moves from placid and simple to complex and diverse. The police no longer will personally know all the people they will be deal- ing with and, as a result, will become increasingly formal in their interactions with citizens. If a new firm creates hazardous waste, think of the new expertise and enforcement obligations the officers of the town need to acquire. There are profound differences between big-city and rural policing because of their complex versus simple task environments. The most complex environ- ment for criminal justice agencies exists within a densely populated industrial county in which a number of cities of varying sizes have police agencies, courts with misdemeanor jurisdiction, and lockups, all of which link to the county or circuit courts of felony jurisdiction and the county sheriff (road patrol and county jail). The members of the criminal justice system must deal with a number of jurisdictions, agencies within and across jurisdictions, and heterogeneous political and cultural systems. We would expect criminal justice practitioners in such large or densely populated jurisdictions to behave in impersonal and highly bureau- cratic ways. In addition, criminal justice practitioners in large jurisdictions have little opportunity for personal contact with influential community members and political figures. Such contact is left to criminal justice administrators, who inter- act with the political–legal system, interpreting public opinions and demands into criminal justice policy. An organization’s environment may be static or dynamic as well as simple or com- plex. A static environment is one that remains constant or stable over time; it is pre- dictable. In our “Sleepy Hollow” example, the police department worked in a static environment before the hypothetical economic and demographic changes took place. As demands on an agency become diverse and unpredictable, the environment takes on a dynamic nature. A dynamic environment is one that is subject to unpredictable change (Duncan, 1972; Steers, 1977). A single task environment can also have both simple and dynamic components. Much of the criminal justice practitioner’s work is routine, repetitive, and predictable; yet some facets are unpredictable. In many respects, the ultimate art of the criminal justice practitioner or administrator is to predict or antic- ipate as many contingencies as possible, thereby simplifying some aspects of a complex, dynamic environment. For example, police agencies attempt to predict crime patterns, traffic patterns, and gang behavior. Parole boards attempt to predict the post-release behavior of inmates. Inasmuch as certain demands placed on the criminal justice system are routine and predictable, much of its agencies’ environment can be considered sta- ble. However, criminal justice agencies are often confronted with surprises and new demands from their environment. The influx of mentally ill inmates into the jails and prisons may, in retrospect, have been predictable, but it was not predicted, at least in an operational sense. The smooth flow of cases through a prosecutor’s office and the court may be disrupted by a heinous crime that gains a great deal of notoriety. The prosecu- tor and staff may be forced to spend a great deal of time and energy on the case to satisfy public expectations for successful prosecution. Urban police work can often be highly complex and unpredictable. An excel- lent example occurred in New York City in 1967, when a citywide power outage occurred because of a problem in a utility company generator. In the chaos that followed, looters broke retail store windows and stole merchandise. In mobilizing and dealing with this unexpected contingency, the police increased arrests, which, in turn, put pressure on lockups, bail and bond systems, prosecutors’ staffs, courts, probation departments, and county correctional facilities. More recently, the emergence of homeless people in cities of any size has given the criminal justice system a new social control challenge. It is estimated that there are more than 600,000 homeless people in large cities across the nation and at least one-third of the homeless suffer from mental illness (Stranton, Blough, and Hawk, 2004). The point here is that the criminal justice system typically bears the responsibility for dealing with unique and unforeseen situations that impact the social infrastructure. ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENT The more dynamic and complex an organizational environment is, the greater the environmental uncertainty associated with it. And the more an organiza- tion perceives uncertainty in the cues and demands from its environment, the more difficulty it will have in making effective decisions. Environmental Uncertainty The perception of uncertainty in the environment is the result of three condi- tions: a lack of information about environmental factors important to decision making, an inability to estimate how probabilities will affect a decision until it is implemented, and a lack of information about the cost associated with an incorrect decision (Duncan, 1972). What is pivotal, as we see later in this chap- ter, is an organization’s ability to respond appropriately to its environment. A public agency that fails to maintain successful relationships with its environ- ment will fail to be responsive to demands, will not appropriate adequate resources and support for its activities (Rourke, 1986; Sharkansky, 1972; Wildavsky, 1974), and will be unable to adapt to significant environmental change (Scott, 1987). Decoupled Organizations To add to the issue of uncertainty, large organizations tend to become decoupled—that is, they face multiple environments and interact with each environment at different organizational levels. To complicate matters further, an environment may have two subenvironments to which an agency may have to respond: the political–legal and service–delivery subenvironments. We can understand this concept by looking outward from organizations as they interact with the environment. Large organizations tend to break into overlapping sub- groups, the dominant coalition and the work processors. The dominant coalition is the small group of employees who oversee the organization and dictate policy decisions; the work processors are the bulk of the organization’s members who are directly involved with its primary clientele (Nokes, 1960). Each sub- group of the organization faces different demands and pressures from different sources. Members of the dominant coalition interact with the political–legal sys- tem, administrators of related organizations, organized support and opposition groups, and the news media; the dominant coalition typically becomes the focal point of public pressure. These policy-level administrators must deal with political and public opi- nions that reflect the often conflicting views of the organization’s multiple constituencies. In responding to the variety of pressures from the political environment, the dominant coalition must be concerned with their agency’s myths, image, and posture. The work processors, in contrast, deal directly with agency clientele and deliver services to them (Meyer and Rowan, 1978; Nokes, 1960). In large systems, work processors become “street-level bureaucrats” who negotiate rules for the allocation of scarce agency resources with clients (Lipsky, 1980). Figure 3.2 shows a decoupled organization inter- acting with its subenvironments. Decoupled organizations face a unique set of problems. To begin with, the cues, pressures, and constraints that the dominant coalition faces may be profoundly different from those faced by members of the work process group. For example, elites may demand that wife abusers be arrested more frequently—or policymakers may perceive that such demands will be forth- coming—and policy will be directed toward increased arrests of wife abusers. However, street police officers may be reluctant to do so because past expe- rience with their clientele has convinced them that arresting wife abusers may not be an effective way to deal with the problem (Galliher, 1985). Or, administrators may feel they must wage wars on drugs or gambling, while law enforcement officers may understand that certain forms of drug use or gambling are approved behaviors within their community, and they may actively avoid controlling those types of crimes on their beats (Wilson, 1968). Corrections systems provide especially fruitful examples of decoupled orga- nizations. Corrections reform has been the concern of concerted political elites since 1870, when the National Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Disci- pline met in Cincinnati. This group called for sweeping reforms and implemen- tation of standards for the maintenance and management of inmates. Since then, other meetings of establishment elites (Quinney, 1974) have been convened with this goal, and lasting groups, such as the American Correctional Association, have been formed and have prescribed standards for corrections. Courts have intervened and provided inmates with constitutional rights and have examined prison and jail conditions under a constitutional microscope. Even though it is reflected in the written policies and procedures of most corrections systems, this collective effort for change has functioned primarily to maintain and legitimize the corrections system by updating the language and symbols that explain the system to the public (Kalinich and Banas, 1984). As demands from the political–legal environment are by the dominant coalition, the work processors— corrections officers and other staff—work pragmatically with the raw material—the inmates—to keep the system in some semblance of order. Day-to-day work is typically based on a series of informal rules negotiated between corrections staff and inmates (Kalinich and Stojkovic, 1985) and may have nothing to do with the prescriptions and standards promulgated by interested elites, pressure groups, or the courts. The process of decentralizing, or federalizing, a large bureaucracy is typi- cally done so that work processors have enough flexibility to deal with their local clientele or to respond to the demands of their local constituents. Decen- tralization is, in effect, recognition that local environmental dimensions may differ at various levels of the organization and that the organization may face more than one environment. Police agencies in large metropolitan areas are often broken into a number of districts that are governed by district comman- ders, who work with some degree of autonomy from the central bureaucracy. Parole agencies are typically governed loosely by a central office and broken into geographical districts, with each district expected to function with some degree of autonomy. However, the different environments an agency faces can create friction between central office staff and field staff even in formally decentralized bureaucracies (McCleary, 1978; also see Pfeffer, 1978 and Selz- nick 1949). McCleary’s (1978) interesting organizational study of a parole system describes the impact of different operational philosophies held by the dominant coalition—the central office—and the work processors— parole officers and district supervisors—on fundamentals of parole supervision in a state agency. The central office, for example, attempting to update the system, felt that it was inappropriate for a modern, professional parole system to have its officers carry guns. The central office decreed that officers would no longer be allowed to carry guns in the field. Parole officers, however, continued to carry guns, and their immediate supervisors supported them by not enforcing the central office ban on firearms. The central office attempted to alter the image of the agency to be congruent with external expectations about modern professional- ism. However, the parole officers responded to their perceived environmental constraints. It might be argued that the differing views in this situation were based primarily on the personal values of the community members. However, many of our job-related values and norms come from our immediate work group, which is affected by the environment in which it is immersed (Hall, 1987; Steers, 1977). Basically, each group responded to what it perceived to be the realities or expectations of its own environment. However, their perceptions of environmental demands were filtered by their work-group norms, past prac- tices, and personal agendas (McCleary, 1978). But organizations are not help- less entities that ritualistically respond to environmental forces. In the following section, we discuss the common methods agencies use to manage environmen- tal forces. Work Perspective: CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL When California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger appointed me to the position of Inspector General in March, 2004, I found a state prison system in desperate need of oversight. The prisons were terribly overcrowded, health care for inmates was abysmal, and the organization was unable to effectively investigate and discipline officers who committed misconduct. These problems were exacer- bated by the sheer size of the California prison system, with a current annual budget exceeding $8 billion, more than 55,000 employees, over 170,000 inmates in 33 adult pris- ons, and 115,000 parolees. Needless to say, the job of leading an oversight agency in this environment was daunt- ing. To make matters worse, between 2002 and 2003, the California legislature had cut the budget of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) by 80 percent, which resulted in a reduction in staffing levels for the agency from 115 to 20. Fortunately, in early 2004, the governor and the legislature agreed to commit the state to a vigorous oversight model. The governor’s budget provided the funding and statutory changes necessary to get the OIG back on its feet and on the road to making the California prison system more trans- parent and accountable to the public. Almost three years later, it is apparent that, although some progress has been made, California prisons are still struggling with several core issues. For example, the U.S. District Court, Northern District, has praised the depart- ment and the OIG for important improvements made to internal affairs investigations and the officer discipline pro- cess. In addition, I am particularly proud of the work accomplished by my staff in re-establishing the OIG as a fully staffed, independent oversight agency. However, some pro- blems are proving to be quite intractable. Prison overcrowd- ing is worse than ever, prompting the governor to declare a state of emergency, permitting the state to send inmates to prisons in other states. Similarly, the availability and quality of medical care has been so poor that the federal court has decided to appoint a receiver to take complete control of this $1 billion operation. In these challenging circumstances, the OIG has established four goals or guiding principles: (1) to rigorously investigate and audit the California prison system, (2) to infuse maximum public transparency into the opera- tion of California prisons, (3) to collaborate with state cor- rectional leaders and outside stakeholders to facilitate finding the best solution to each identified problem, and (4) to hold the prison system administrators publicly accountable for implementing necessary reforms. Experience has taught me that to accomplish these goals, one must acquire a keen understanding of the political, legal, and bureaucratic landscape in California, as well as the ability to work effectively with the myriad of power brokers, both inside and outside of state government, who have the ability to effectuate change. Of course, the most powerful person in California gov- ernment is the head of state, Governor Arnold Schwarzeneg- ger. The governor not only decides which bills will become law and which agencies will receive the lion’s share of state fund- ing, but he also appoints all of the executives in the correc- tional system, who in turn make correctional policy. Accordingly, I make a point to meet with the governor’s staff on a regular basis to discuss the state of California’s prisons and suggest ways in which they can be improved. Moreover, even with his incredibly busy schedule, the governor has per- sonally met with me on several occasions to discuss the most serious of California’s prison-related problems. On the other end of the political spectrum is the Cali- fornia Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), a labor union that has frequently criticized the governor’s approach to correctional reform and, most recently, has placed both its endorsement and its multimillion-dollar war chest behind the governor’s Democratic rival for the posi- tion of governor in the 2006 election. Through a series of meetings and correspondence, the CCPOA has brought for- ward its views concerning what it sees as wrong with the prison system and how the system should be fixed. The union has been very public with its views in this regard and has focused the majority of its criticism on the alleged missteps of the administrators the governor has appointed. As with every member of the public, the union has the ability to make complaints to the OIG and request audits of sys- temic problems or investigations of employee misconduct. Depending on the merits of the request, some are accepted by the OIG intake committee while others are rejected. The governor’s office is not consulted in this process. The California legislature is also a key player in the field of prison reform. Legislators not only write the laws, but they also hold the government purse strings through their power over appropriations. Further, individual legislators or committees have the authority to call for public hearings on issues before them, including misconduct of prison employees or, more commonly, mismanagement of aspects of the prison system. As such, the legislature has both the authority to uncover mis- conduct and the ability to address it by changing applicable laws. Often the OIG and legislators will work together to address issues. For example, the OIG currently is investigating misconduct by a correctional administrator at the request of a special legislative committee. In addition, at the request of a state senator, the OIG has just completed an audit of several substance abuse treatment providers whom the audit discov- ered had overcharged the state for their services by almost $5,000,000. In turn, the senator has announced that she will now hold a hearing on the matter to determine whether a leg- islative solution is possible. Due to the powerful political players involved in the man- agement and reform of the correctional system, it is absolutely necessary for an oversight agency to have complete indepen- dence. Fortunately, this is now built into the OIG statutory framework. For example, although the inspector general is appointed by the governor, he or she must be confirmed by the majority of the state Senate based on the candidate’s skills and experience. In addition, once confirmed the inspector gen- eral serves a sixyear term and cannot be removed, except for misconduct. Further independence has been achieved through a recent legislative change requiring that the OIG’s budget be based on the office’s workload from the previous year, thereby preventing a future administration from starving the OIG through budget cuts. As a result, the inspector general is able to accept the most meritorious audit and investigative projects, regardless of how the political winds may blow. There are, however, stakeholders in the prison reform process who are outside of the political process altogether. The most important of these by far is the federal court. In Cali- fornia, inmate lawsuits have resulted in the court’s total control of medical care and close oversight of mental health care, den- tal care, juvenile custody and treatment, parole practices, care of disabled inmates, and the officer discipline process. Although the OIG is not a party to any of these suits, it has been called on in several of these cases to provide part of the solution. The best example is in the field of officer discipline. Through an agreement between the federal court and the gov- ernor, the OIG was asked to create a new bureau that would be tasked with providing “real-time” oversight of the department’s internal affairs cases and to publicly report on the quality of the investigations, the appropriateness of the punishment meted out, and any systemic changes that should be made to improve the officer discipline process. This agreement has resulted in the creation of the Bureau of Independent Review within the OIG. The new bureau has now hired lawyers and investigators with experience in this field, opened offices, and started to pub- licly report on the progress made by the department in reform- ing the officer discipline process. In creating this bureau, the OIG has met regularly with the federal court to report on its progress, the prisoner’s attorneys to discuss their concerns with the system, department administrators to hold them accountable for reform, and the governor’s office to discuss our vision for the future. The development of the Bureau of Independent Review is a very good example of how, in a com- plex environment with multiple interested parties, it is neces- sary to work closely with all factions in order to reach the best solutions for the people of the state. SOURCE: Matthew L. Cate, Inspector General, 2012. MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES Almost all organizations are vulnerable to environmental forces, although to varying degrees (Jacobs, 1974). Organizations are open systems dependent on, and constrained by, environmental systems for mandates, authority, and resources, and they must produce goods or services for their clients. In effect, organizations must enter into exchange relations across their boundaries with other systems (Scott, 1987). Moreover, organizations constantly adapt to envi- ronmental pressures by altering their mission, goals, and means of doing business and evaluating their success or failure (Schein, 2004). This is an important consideration because the ability of an organization to develop favorable exchange relations with its environment is ultimately related to its effectiveness (Osborn and Hunt, 1974). Organizations, how- ever, often do not maintain such relations and instead attempt to behave as rational, or closed, systems. They expend efforts at setting and policing their boundaries in an effort to protect their core from external environmental influences (Thompson, 1967). For example, police agencies moving to com- munity policing must deal with external challenges as well as internal threats if implementation is to be successful (Giacomazzi, Riley, and Merz, 2004). Organizations are, therefore, subjected to the task of managing and coping with their environments. Managing environments requires exerting control over environmental forces or creating mechanisms to buffer the agency from inputs. Production organizations stockpile raw materials, accumulate cash reserves, and control their markets with advertising and other strategies, all in an attempt to make them less dependent on their environments (Blau, 1955). As public bureaucracies, criminal justice agencies get their inputs (mandates, resources, support and opposition for programs) from the political–legal and cultural systems. Like other public agencies, they can pro- tect their boundaries by invoking their bureaucratic power in both the for- mal and informal political systems or by conforming or appearing to conform to environmental demands or expectations through symbols and rhetoric. Influencing Input It is tempting to think of public bureaucracies, especially criminal justice agencies, as apolitical or above politics in the performance of their duties. An earlier version of this rationalistic view of public organizations posited that the political structure created policy and that public administrators car- ried out policy (Henry, 2007). However, bureaus have the power to influ- ence policy inputs from the political system (Long, 1949). Legislators who control budgets and create social policy depend on agencies to carry out their programs. In addition, agencies have expertise on which lawmakers depend when creating policy changes (Rourke, 1976). Agency administra- tors are typically called on to provide information and to advise or state their position to legislative bodies that are proposing legislation that would restrict or broaden the scope of an agency’s duties or powers. Legislative committees routinely call on directors of corrections, chiefs of police, and jail administrators to define problems and solutions or to respond to ques- tions and issues put to them by the public. Police, courts, and correctional agencies also forward budgets and programs annually to their governing political bodies and argue their positions based on their unique understand- ing and expertise. The budgeting process is an opportunity for criminal jus- tice administrators to propose programs and legislation that would alter the scope of their organization’s duties as well as expand their resources (Cord- ner and Hudzik, 1983). Criminal justice administrators who understand the political process and are capable of acting as “statespersons” (Downs, 1967; Rourke, 1976) for their agen- cies can have extraordinary influence and power over political inputs. The Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation under the directorship of J. Edgar Hoover is a testimony to the ability of a criminal justice agency to protect its boundaries through its influence over the formal political process (Powers, 1987). Chiefs of police or corrections administrators who either reject the political aspects of their role or are simply inept at functioning within the political process typically fail to protect their agencies from political inputs. Bureaus may also influence the open political system by gathering sup- port from public groups. Allen (2008) suggests that efforts to increase public confidence for community service sentences can be effective. He proposes strategies to publicize the good work done for the public by community- service sentenced offenders to impact public attitudes toward community service sentences. A number of groups exist outside the criminal justice sys- tem that attempt to constrain, support, or direct organizational policy. Such groups include the American Correctional Association, National Sheriffs’ Association, American Friends Service Committee, Fraternal Order of Police, American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union, and to some extent for corrections, the American Medical Association (Fairchild, 1981; Stolz, 1985). Although their means may differ—the American Civil Liberties Union brings issues to the public through lawsuits and public decrees, and the American Correctional Association promulgates standards for corrections operations—the views of such groups can have an effect on the formal political and legal systems (Melone, 1985; Stolz, 1985). How- ever, criminal justice administrators may use these groups for support in the open political system because the membership of many of these organi- zations is made up primarily of criminal justice practitioners and administrators. The news media act as a conduit between agencies and the environment. A media message can create support for or opposition to an agency or its pro- grams and can also be a vehicle for a bureau to influence key sources in its environment. It is common for agencies at the federal level to exploit the news media to influence their immediate environment as well as the public. Information can be leaked, for example, to test for responses or to bring pres- sure to bear on other subcomponents or the hierarchical levels of a bureau (Halperin, 1978). Using the media’s influence to protect agency boundaries is a robust technique that criminal justice agencies do not exploit, even though the opportunity seems eminently available; public interest in “cops and rob- bers” appears insatiable. Criminal justice agencies have made clumsy ventures at public relations and public influence by using the media, especially with police community relations advertising campaigns encouraging citizens to take steps to prevent crime (Radelet, 1986). The exception to this rule is again the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has done an outstanding job of devel- oping contacts with the media and presenting an impeccable image of itself. Also, most elected sheriffs, being political by nature, typically have a good sense of how to deal with the media. However, police and corrections agencies have typically received nega- tive press coverage, both because of the sensationalism of the enterprise and, perhaps in part, because the lack of motivation of local or state civil servants may be compared with a politically oriented administrator, such as an elected sheriff or a federal bureaucrat. Our heuristic view is that media information about the criminal justice system has been generally negative and has brought occasional hostile pressures to bear on criminal justice agencies rather than presenting their practices in a favorable light to the public and the political– legal system (Radelet, 1986). Using Symbols An organization can also protect its boundaries by using symbolic expres- sions that represent an organization’s portion, belief, or values. For example, the uniform a police officer wears acts as a symbol of his or her authority and helps set the boundaries between citizens and the police. Symbolic statements are often published as slogans, and pithy rhetoric is used to express philosophy, policies, and means of operations in abbreviated form. The limited understanding of bureaus by most outside their boundaries, along with the sloppiness of human thinking, causes excessive reliance on symbol- ism, making it a powerful communication tool. The symbols, slogans, or rhetoric evoked by an organization become codes, representing agency phi- losophy and lending meaning to entrenched policy (Kalinich, Lorinskas, and Banas, 1985). The process of evoking symbols is a significant aspect of the criminal justice system because the system is shaped by innumerable symbols and myths (Atkins and Pogrebin, 1981). Organizations consequently spend a sig- nificant part of their resources on such window dressing (Wilensky, 1967). Symbols can be seen, for example, in sweeping goal statements that are non- operational and encompass the needs or demands of a broad constituency. Agencies use these general symbolic statements to give them the appearance of conforming to the demands of clients, constituents, and other forces in the environment. When environmental pressures demand changes in an agency’s philosophies, scope of duties, activities, and